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FOREWORD 
The annual Pacific Islands Studies Conferences are projects of the 
Outreach Proaram of the Pacific Islands Studies Center, an NDEA Title VI 
Language and~ Area Studi es Center for Paci fi c Isl ands Studies at the Uni-
versity of Hawaii. This series of conferences was initiated to encourage 
greater cooperation among the faculties of the various campuses of the 
University of Hawaii, with the objective of expanding Pacific-related 
academi c endeavors throughout the statewi de uni versi ty system. More 
recently thi s outreach acti vity has sought with good success parti ci pati on 
by the business and government communities and the public and private 
secondary teachers and students. 
With the publication of these proceedings of the Fourth Annual Pacific 
lsI ands Studi es Conference comes the opportunity to extend our outreach 
effort to our colleagues at other universities in the Pacific and Europe, 
to readers in libraries in other Pacific islands, and to libraries and 
universities on the United States mainland, Europe and Asia. 
Unoer the guidance of a Pacific Islands Studies Center advisory com-
mittee comprised of Ms. Brenda Foster, Director of the Pacific and Asian 
Affairs Council (PAAC), Dr. Robert Kiste, Director of the Pacific Islands 
Studies master1s program, Mr. Donald Shuster, doctoral student in education 
and myself, Ms. Jane N. Hurd, Outreach Coordinator of the Pacific Islands 
Studies Center organized and coordinated the Fourth Annual Pacific Islands 
Studies Conference entitled: The E~erging Pacific Island States. 
To all those individuals who made presentations, attended the confer-
ence, posed valuable questions, offered important suggestions and completed 
conference evaluations, I extend a personal and heartfelt mahalo. 
Carl J. Daeufer, Director 
Pacific Islands Studies Center 
Honolulu, Hawaii 
Summer 1979 
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Editor's Introduction 
These proceedings of the 4th annual Pacific Islands Studies Conference, 
liThe Emerging Pacific Island States,1I held on April 6 and 7, 1979, at the 
University of Hawaii, document one event in the on-going effort of the Pacific 
Islands Studies Program and the federally-funded Pacific Islands Studies Center 
whi cil supports it, to provi de faculty, students and Pacifi c-; nterested commu-
nity members with an update on the implications of the rapid political, social 
and economic changes taking place today in the Pacific Islands region. 
Nearly a score more than the 138 who registered attended portions of 
the two-day conference lA/hi ch featured 18 speakers from the academi c community, 
90vernment and the press. 
This volume includes papers prepared by the conference speakers. The 
papers presented Friday evening, those of Dr. Daeufer and Mr. Kono, concern 
Hawaii's role in the future of the changing Pacific horizon. 
The Saturday morni ng remarks of Drs. Finney, Severance and Hamnett offer 
perspectives on the concept of dependency in tenns of their observations on 
the experience of four Pacific societies. 
The participation of Mr. William Bodde of the U.S. Department of State 
was through the courtesy of an arrangement between his agency's Public Affairs 
Division and the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council (PAAC). His speech reflects 
U.S. policy in the Pacific much as that of Fred Rohlfing, Director of the 
Amerika Samoa Liaison Office in Hawaii, describes American Samoa's assessment 
of its role in the Pacific's future. 
In the afternoon a panel of media specialists related their experiences 
as journalists in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Guam, Fiji, the 
Gilbert Islands and here in Hawaii. A summary of their roundtable, IIMedia's 
Role in Pacific Islands Politics," has been written by Dr. Thomas Brislin. 
Consideration of the changing patterns of Pacific development surely must 
include discussion of the politics of fisheries in the region. In his paper, 
"South Pacific Fisheries Politics," originally written for publication in the 
Summer, 1979 issue of Impulse, the magazine of East-West Center participants, 
Dr. George Kent presents issues pertaining to jurisdictional rights in Pa-
cific waters. Dr. Scott Allen's paper, liThe Pacific and the Law of the Sea," 
considers the international politics of the Law of the Sea. 
Finally, Dr. Donald Topping provides participants and readers alike a 
thoughtful analysis of the topics that were discussed--and those left un-
touched--during the conference. 
Among those who contributed to the success of the conference were Ms. 
Brenda Foster and her PAAC staff, who cooperated in the organization of the 
conference, particularly Ms. Larke Golaski who spent many hours working on 
this manuscript and Ms. Jan Hiranaka who typed and proofread this manuscript. 
Ms. Karen Knudsen shared with me the responsibility and effort of putting 
together both the conference and these proceedings and deserves untold thanks. 
Any errors in this manuscript are ours. 
Jane N. Hurd 
Pacific Area Specialist 
Pacific Islands Studies Center 
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Friday, April 6, 1979 
Opening Remarks 
by 
Dr. Carl J. Daeufer 
Director, Pacific Islands Studies Center 
Professor, College of Education 
University of Hawaii at Manoa 
Good evening ladies and gentlemen. Tonight we launch the fourth in a 
series of annual conferences initiated by the Pacific Islands Studies Center. 
For those of you who have been with us at each conference you will recall 
that the first conference occurred in 1976. One of the purposes of these 
annual systemwide University of Hawaii Pacific Islands conferences is to 
bring together faculty and students from all campuses of the university 
system. Additionally, we have encouraged members of the community at-large 
as well as students and teachers from Hawaii's public and private secondary 
schools to attend each conference. As in the past, let me take this moment 
to extend a personal welcome to each of you. 
Our first conference in 1976 was designed to identify those faculty and 
resources throughout the University of Hawaii system and members of historical 
societies who share the Pacific Islands area as a scholarly and teaching 
interest. While a strong scholarly community has long existed on the Manoa 
campus, no one had previously identified and brought together statewide uni-
versity faculty and individuals representing various historical societies 
and professional associations concerned with Pacific Islands studies. That 
afternoon-evening conference in 1976 was a first attempt to create a coor-
dinated statewide appraisal of efforts in Pacific Islands scholarship. 
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Our second conference in Apri 1, 1977, set out to determi ne how to under-
stand the issues of development in the Pacific Islands region in order to 
apply these to teaching and/or research design and to explore what pattern(s) 
of development might be best for setting priorities in developmental planning 
activities in island countries. That day-long conference-workshop with the 
theme Development in the Pacific centered on the political, economic, social 
and demographic implications of development planning in Pacific Island 
communities. 
In 1978, the planners of the third annual conference responded to the 
previous year's participants' wishes to have a longer conference. Thus, with 
the theme, ~tain Cook and the Pacific Islands, last year's conference sched-
uled an evening presentation followed by three sessions the next day. Addi-
tionally, the Pacific Islands Studies Center ventured into the publication of 
the conference proceedings, with each registered participant receiving a copy. 
The Pacific Islands Studies Center continues to sponsor with pride this 
annual conference together with the invaluable assistance from both the Pacific 
and Asian Affairs Council and the Pacific Islands Studies Program and supports 
the participation of University systemvdde faculty. Again, the Center plans. 
to publish the proceedings of this conference and will send a copy to each 
registered participant. 
Last year in my welcome and introductory remarks an offer was extended 
to those in attendance. An offer that for one reason or another was not taken 
up by anyone. An offer that should be voiced again. 
This offer is motivated by our continuing interest in seeking your sug-
gestions, direct help and important involvement in planning and sponsoring 
future conferences and by my concern that to obtain this broad-based involve-
ment perhaps we need to establish a Pacific Islands Association, non-profit 
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in nature, made up of interested faculty, students and community leaders whose 
goals and purposes are central to the fostering of understanding and knowledge 
of the peoples and cultures of the Pacific Islands region. If you have an 
interest in involving yourself in the establishment of such an association, 
please contact us directly or write about such an interest somewhere on the 
evaluation forms that will be distributed. 
Our conference this year, as was the case last year, spans two days. 
Following this evening's keynote address, four challenging sessions are sched-
uled tomorrow. All focus appropriately on the theme: The Emerging Pacific 
Island States. 
Before I introduce our speaker this evening, let me touch ever so briefly 
on the current status of the Emerging Pacific Island states. The decoloni-
zation and emergence of self-governing Pacific Island nations is a relatively 
recent geopolitical event, and, according to many international political 
leaders, scholars and Pacific Islands observers, is also most welcomed. While 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries represent a time of active Euro-
pean expansion, or empire building, in the Pacific, the last two decades have 
witnessed the birth of numerous independent island states. Of the twenty is-
land countries and/or territories in the Pacific basin who in fact have the 
clear option of self-government and/or independence, ten have or will have 
attained independence or self-government by July, 1979. 
As metropolitan authorities, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia 
have been in the forefront of this process of political change. In 1962 West~ 
ern Samoa became the first fully independent Polynesian state. Three years 
later, the Cook Islands achieved self-government in Free Association with New 
Zealand. Nauru, with astute island leaders and a valuable economic resource, 
acquired independence in 1968 and full control over the lucrative phosphate 
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industry two years later. Fiji, with a population of nearly 600,000 and 
unsettling ethnic and racial tensions, gained independence from the United 
Kingdom in 1970. In the same year, Tonga, the only remaining Polynesian 
kingdolTI, became completely independent of Great Britain. Tongan political 
history dates from an 1875 constitution and foreign treaties which recognized 
the island state's de jure independence. De facto independence, however, 
\'/aited nearly a century to occur. 
In 1974 and 1975 the small island of Ni~e and the giant Papua New Guinea 
each attained new political status. Niue, like the Cook Islands, opted for 
self-government in Free Association with New Zealand. Papua New Guinea, rich 
in natural resources and diverse cultures, became fully independent in 1975 
after 90 years of colonial rule. Last year the Solomon Islands and land-scarce 
Tuvalu (formerly the Ellice Islands) became fully independent nations. Later 
this year the Gilbert Islands, the closest island group to the State of Hawaii, 
will become the independent nation of Kiribati and, from preliminary indica-
tions, may be looking north to Hawaii for economic relations and other assistance. 
In Micronesia, more specifically the area referred to as the Trust Territory 
of the Pacific Islands, political events are moving apace .. The Northern Mariana 
Islands are one year into Commonwealth status with the United States and are 
witnessing their share of different groups seeking internal political power. 
Palau and the Marshall Islands will, in all probability, soon install consti-
tutional governments in place of the Trust Territory administration. The Fed-
erated States of Micronesia, which presently includes Ponape, Truk, Kosrae and 
Yap, has very recently elected a new Congress and is looking toward 1981, when 
it and the break-away districts of Palau and the Marshalls will become self-
governing states, freely associated with the United States. 
With the notable exception of the French territories, political change 
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has been relatively rapid in the Pacific basin in the last two decades. It 
is difficult to believe that this process, which appears to have a tone of 
inevitability to it, will leave the French territories untouched. 
This new political character of the islands in the Pacific basin, coupled 
with advances in modern air travel and telecommunications which brings us all 
closer together, raises an important question for Hawaii, "What are the rami-
fications and the potential of Hawaii IS present and future relationships with 
the other Pacific islands?1I 
To speak to this question, we are fortunate to have with us this evening 
Mr. Hideto Kono, Director, Department of Planning & Economic Development, State 
of Hawaii. 
Mr. Kono was born in Hilo, Hawaii. He attended Hilo High School, graduated 
from the University of Hawaii with a BA degree and an MA in Public Administration. 
He served as a research assistant with the University Legislative Reference 
Bureau, was Chief Clerk, Senate Ways & Means Committee during two separate 
legislative sessions, served as Staff Council, Joint Legislative Commission 
for the Reorganization of Hawaii State Government and was Acting Deputy Direc-
tor, East-West Center (on loan from the Dole Company for six months). In pri-
vate industry Mr. Kono served as Vice-President of Dole-Itochu Food Co., Ltd., 
Tokyo; Vice-President, Jintan Dole Company, Ltd., Osaka and as President, Castle 
& Cooke East Asia Company for ten years prior to becoming Director, State De-
partment of Planning & Economic Development in 1974. Mr. Kono is a member of 
the Honolulu Symphony Society and was Director of the Hawaii Visitors Bureau 
for two years. 
We are aware, Mr. Kono, of your outstanding achievements as a public 
administrator and international business manager. We view your acceptance of 
our invitation to speak here tonight as symbolic of the State of Hawaii 
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Department of Planning & Economic Development's mandated responsibility to 
be innovative and creative in carrying out its planning and economic develop-
ment functions. We sense your interest in exploring the potential and rami-
fications of Hawaii's present and future relationships with other Pacific 
islands and are eager to hear now what you have come to relate regarding 
IIHawaii's Plan for Future Relations with the Other Pacific Islands. 1I 
Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to introduce to you 
Mr. Hideto Kono, Director, Department of Planning & Economic Development, 
State of Hawaii. 
Hawaii's Plans for Future Relations with the Other Pacific Islands 
by 
Mr. Hideto Kono 
Director, Department of Planning & Economic Development 
State of Hawaii 
Good evening! I am grateful for the invitation to discuss Hawaii's 
future relations with the other Pacific Islands. As State Director of Plan-
ning for the past four and a quarter years, foretelling the future has been 
one of my major preoccupations. I would, if I could, prefer to foretell the 
future far beyond the twenty-first century, as I would then be secure in the 
chance that I would not be a personal witness to being proven wrong. 
Nevertheless, I am required by the nature of my present position to look 
toward the nearer future, to outguess fate, and to help plant today for to-
morrow's harvest. So, with some reservations, I dare to discuss our future 
relationships with the other Pacific Islands, the presentation assigned to 
me by your program chairwoman. 
Let us first, together, try to grasp the scope of the Pacific Islands. 
There are, as you know, thousands of them, many vacant and many others 
inhabited. They represent hundreds of communities of people of different 
languages, customs, lifestyles, traditions, hopes and fears. A glance at 
the map of the Pacific shows the enormity of the region, sprinkled with is-
lands as the heavens are sprinkled with stars. 
Yet this vastness should not discourage our desire for contact, communi-
cation, and working together for the common good. You must recall the mira-
cles of modern technology if you are at first dismayed by the awesome size 
and distances of the Pacific Islands region. Consider, for example, that on 
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the mainland there is a United States population of about 220 million persons. 
Within five minutes~ I can reach almost anyone of those 220 million people~ 
talk with him or her~ confide anything I want to confide~ convey messages im-
portant or trivial~ and even tell a funny joke and have that person burst out 
laughing 6~000 miles away. Such is the miracle of our age of swift communication. 
And often within 10 to 20 hours~ I can~ if I wish~ be at that person's side. 
Such is our miracle of modern transportaion. 
So it is important to remind ourselves of such marvels and miracles which 
we now take so much for granted~ when we wish to consider our future in the 
Pacific. Given the grace of God and the ingenuity of man~ we can dream dreams 
of transportation~ communication~ and other advances which will ~ in a not too 
distant future, make our present world seem primitive in comparison. 
Among the first and most important steps we must take in preparing for 
future relationships between Hawaii and the other Pacific Islands is to avoid 
taking things for granted. We must avoid thinking small~ being manini in our 
outlook~ or thinking in stereotypes. For example, we must not take for granted 
that because Hawaii has millions of income-producing tourists~ that all the 
Pacific Islands would need and would benefit from more tourism. We must avoid--
and this is a hard one for us to swallow--requiring that everyone must speak 
our English language, rather than the native tongue of the Tongans or the Toke-
lau Islanders. We must not insist that a materialistic culture predominate in 
lands which have long treasured religious or familial values as supreme. In 
short~ we must learn to live with diversity, relishing differences while working 
in a spirit of mutual helpfulness toward varying goals. We must avoid at all 
costs the idea that because Hawaii has been blessed with material prosperity, 
that we have also cornered the market on wisdom and intelligence. 
At the same time, there are practical things we can and should do here 
and now to foster the spirit of Pacific harmony and community. 
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Governor George Ariyoshi in his preface to a publication, Hawaii and the 
Other Pacific Islands, published recently by my department referred to the 
many links Hawaii already had developed with the other peoples in the Pacific 
region. Noting the newly independent States which have been established, the 
Governor said, 
"In this historical ferment of political, social, 
cultural and economic change, Hawaii cannot sit passively 
as an unconcerned spectator. Hawaii has solemn obligations 
based upon its unique geographical location, its Polynesian 
roots and pattern of historical development, its present 
economic leadership among the many Island groups, and its 
diverse ethnic and cultural ties with other Pacific 
communities. 
II Hawa iii s ca 11 ed to offer itself as a 1 eader, a 
partner, a friend, a counselor, a cooperating Sister-State 
to any and all in the Pacific who would desire such a 
relationship. This special role would be carried out, 
of course, within the constitutional and legal limita-
tions imposed upon each of the 50 States of the Union. 
But while there exist certain limitations, there also 
are many latitudes and freedoms which generate enthusiasm 
for action." 
It was Governor Ariyoshi who, in his interest in expanding our Pacific 
contacts, last April named Mr. Myron Thompson, the Bishop Estate trustee, as 
the Governor's Special Assistant for the Pacific Islands. Currently in our 
State Government, we have a number of activities concerned with the other 
Pacific Islands, including three in the Department of Planning & Economic 
Development: Foreign-Trade Zone No.9, the Hawaii International Services 
Agency, and the Economic Development Division. There is also the multination-
ally supported East-West Center; the many University programs with which you 
are certainly familiar, and of course the private sector's many companies and 
agencies including the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council. 
All of these activities have built upon the hard work and experience of 
people who have gone on before us, and to whom we owe much gratitude. Hawaii 
is recognized today as a center for many activities closely related to the 
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other Pacific Islands. But the future must be planned. It should not simply 
occur. Our planning should consider a number of potentials for relationships 
with the other Pacific Island groups which can be mutually profitable. Among 
these are business and commercial ties including more efficient organizationj 
energy cooperation; tourism and tropical agriculture growth; and cultural and 
intellectual links. 
In the business sector, innovative risk-taking efforts are sorely needed 
in this Pacific region. There are hundreds of products which thousands of is--
landers need, but the financing of production, training of workers, marketing 
and transporting of products, and governmental red tape, all remain formidable 
barriers. Hawaii could be an ideal test market for products from the other 
Islands. It could also be a source of supplies for those myriad Islands, pro-
vided logistics problems can be worked out. By becoming a central headquarters 
for what might be called a Pacific Islands cooperative, Hawaii could bring about 
economies of scale and volume efficiencies which individual Island communities, 
working alone, could not develop. This is theoretical, of course; making theory 
work is a very difficult task indeed, but not a hopeless one for enterprising 
entrepreneurs. 
In the field of tourism, Hawaii offers outstanding experience in how to 
manage a multibillion-dollar industry competently, efficiently and profitably. 
But our industry and our economic success make other Pacific Island communities 
somewhat nervous while desirous of participation in its benefits. While some, 
I feel sure, are envious of the economic benefits tourism brings, they want 
nothing of a business which seriously threatens to destroy or extensively change 
the social and cultural patterns of their Island community. Hawaii should have 
no part in pressing upon such communities our ideas or progress, but should 
nevertheless be open to whatever exchanges can be mutually beneficial. Above 
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all, it should be our goal to assist--in ways from which we also will profit--
such communities in their desire to upgrade social welfare without harm to 
the already existing cultural patterns. 
Food production and distribution would seem to offer unlimited opportu-
nities to many Pacific Island communities for economic adventures. Hawaii 
has demonstrated its skills in scientific agriculture and aquaculture, partic-
ularly in sugar, pineapple, macadamia nuts, flowers and foliage, Malaysian 
(now Hawaiian) prawns, and other tropical products. We need to share our 
expertise with others. We need to link ourselves with Pacific Island areas 
which can teach us things, too. New Federal legislation provides for Food 
for Peace funding and additional monies for land-grant and sea-grant universities 
The declaration by nearly all Pacific Island States of 200-mile economic resource 
zones surrounding their Islands adds thousands of miles of fishing resources 
area for their vessels. Hawaii can serve as a good and continuing market for 
imported agricultural products from other Pacific Islands, and one hopes the 
expanded incomes generated by such sales will enable those Islands to buy other 
products from us in a mutually satisfying trade. 
Hawaii's rather remarkable advances in energy should be helpful to other 
Pacific Island communities. We now have more than 6,000 solar water heaters 
in Hawaii, and the technology of such solar collectors appears to improve and 
to become simpler and more efficient with time. Wind energy obtained through 
technologically sophisticated machinery could bring remarkable improvement in 
the living conditions of poorer Pacific Island communities. Modern technology 
has performed production miracles for agriculture allover the world, and we 
should be alert to the potentials for helping Pacific Islanders through inno-
vative energy producers such as windmills, biomass, photovoltaic cells, and 
other small-is-beautiful-and-useful technology. 
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Communications for the vast Pacific Islands region need considerable 
improvement. This need, incidentally, is an example of economic opportunities 
for jobs and profits. The satellite era has offered new hope for eventual 
telecommunication links among the hundreds of scattered island communities. 
Rapid advances in communication technology using the remarkable improvement in 
microelectronics give promise of a new era for Pacific communications. The 
introduction of such technology will, of course, bring mixed results because 
of the pressures that modern technology-oriented cultures--such as today's 
Hawaii--impose on the slower tempos of geographically distant Islands. Com-
munications is the forerunner of other developments; knowledge, greater under-
~ 
standing, increased exchange of information and opinion all increase the human 
desire for change, betterment, and progress. It is probably in the field of 
increased communication that Hawaii can best serve other Pacific Islands. We 
already have, of course, the PEACESAT project--Pan Pacific Education and Com-
munication Experiments by Sate11ite--which uses a NASA satellite and is now in 
its 11th year of linking Hawaii and other users, notably the University of the 
South Pacific. It is a forerunner of many other potentials for exchanging facts, 
knowledge and aspirations. But, such discussion brings us once again to the 
front lines of philosophical differences about where Pacific Island cultures are 
to go. Shall the Solomon Islands receive Shakespeare financed by Mobil or Shell 
Oil, and view the inner turmoil of a New York ghetto subculture, or Hollywood's 
sex life? Again I refer to my earlier remarks about our own culture intruding 
as an allegedly superior one on those alledgedly more primitive. 
It is with such potentials and problems in mind that we must recall Hawaii's 
heritage as a Polynesian island group, and our roots-relationship with other 
island cultures. Our previously mentioned Departmental report on Hawaii and the 
15 
Other Pacific Islands contains the following interesting reference to cultural 
exchange: 
"At the 1976 South Pacific Festival of Arts in Rotorua, 
New Zealand, the Hawaii delegation was the smallest of all 
of the Island groups represented. Nevertheless, the Hawaii 
group performed a wide variety of chants and dances on 
stage, exhibited arts and crafts including feather-cloak 
making, and introduced Hawaiian sports and games to the 
thousands of New Zealanders and tourists present at the 
week-long gathering. There were several Ifirsts l involved 
in this Hawaiian presence in Rotorua: 
lilt was the first time Hawaii was invited to send a 
delegation. At an earlier Festival of Arts, held in Fiji, 
Hawaii wasn1t really considered to be a part of the Pacific 
Community, and hence was not invited. 
"It was the first time most in the standing-room-only 
audiences had an opportunity to see and hear traditional 
Hawaiian chants and dances performed. Most in the audience 
expected contemporary hula dancing of the Hollywood-stereo-
type variety, and it turned out to be an enlightening 
experience for all concerned. 
lilt was the first time many in the Hawaiian group 
were able to communicate with native speakers using other 
,Polynesian dialects, and to be understood in turn. The 
Ne\'J Zea 1 and ~1aori hos ts in Rotorua were exc ited to fi nd 
that they could communicate (in Maori) with their far-flung 
relations across the Pacific. For many Maoris, it reawakened 
their interest in their cultural heritage and encouraged them 
to seek additional forms of exchange for the future." 
You will also recall the tremendous excitement of the 1976 voyage of 
Hokule1a to French Polynesia. We in Hawaii cannot fully understand the impact 
of that canoe1s voyage on the canoe conscious societies south of us. We must 
expand such cultural links for they strengthen the warm human contacts and the 
mutual understanding and appreciation that form the basis of all social progress 
and improvement. 
In our relationships with the other Pacific island communities, we must 
not forget how rural they are. This means Hawaii has a special potential for 
working with them if we remember the pace, lifestyle, and size of our own 
Neighbor Island communities. For example, Papua New Guinea occupies one half 
of the second largest island in the \'Iorld, yet its capital, Port t1oresby, has 
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only 75,000 people--just about the same as the total population of the Island 
of Hawaii. We would do well to involve our Neighbor Islands more in relation-
ships with other island groups for inter-cultural exchange and for information 
on patterns of community settlement, water, energy, other utility development 
and so forth. 
To sum up: the future I envision for Hawaii's relationships with the 
other Pacific Islands is one of a steady increase in links and understanding; 
a slow but steady growth in business and commercial ties; perhaps a faster 
growth in communication; an increased sharing of small-scale technology; and a 
warmer, deeper cultural appreciation of each other, leading eventually to a 
Pacific Islands regional approach to dealing with the rest of the world. Such 
relationships will increase Hawaii's importance and stature as a Pacific Islands 
leader recognized by all, provided we deepen our understanding of our Sister-
Islands to the south and west, and hold them in utmost respect. 
Mahalo. 
Saturday, April 7, 1979 
Tahiti et Mama France 
by 
Dr. Ben R. Finney 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Hawaii at Manoa 
French Polynesia is a colony. In a world that has seen so many former 
possessions of colonial powers achieve independence, French Polynesia remains 
an Overseas Territory of France. Yet, in the early post World War II years, 
there were prospects for political evolution. There was a nascent nationalist 
movement, a literate citizenry--at least in comparison with many other colo-
nial territories--and a moderately stable economy based on farming and fishing 
and the export of cash crops. What happened? Why has political evolution in 
French Polynesia lagged behind most other South Pacific nations, as well as 
most other French overseas possessions? 
This is not meant to be a suspense tale. As you well know, France has 
been most reluctant to consider independence for French Polynesia. While the 
South Pacific dependencies of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
have progressed to independence, or close to it; while the French colonies in 
Asia and Africa have gained their freedom; French Polynesia remains an integral 
part of the metropole in French eyes. France has found this southeast corner 
of Polynesia to be real estate too valuable to give up, and France has also 
found that she can easily push the Polynesians around, or at least gain a re-
signed acquiescence from them for continued French control. 
In 1958 French President Charles De Gaulle gave the French Polynesians 
a choice between voting "yes" to remain in the French community, or "no" for 
immediate severance from France. The late Pouvanaa A Dopa, the charismatic 
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Tahitian leader and head of the majority political party, campaigned for a 
IInoll vote. He lost by a 64% to 36% margin. Shortly thereafter he was dis-
missed from office by De Gaulle. Then he was arrested, tried and convicted 
of the unlawful possession of arms and of having been an accessory in an 
all eged attempt to burn down the town of Papeete. Pouvanaa was sentenced to 
enough years in French jails, and then exile in France, to see him safely 
dead. Charges that the French denied Pouvanaa transport and radio time to 
reach outer island electorate and used other pressures to assure a lIyes ll vote, 
and charges that the case against Pouvanaa was trumped up, may well be true. 
But the apparent fact remains that a segment of the Polynesian population 
then, and perhaps an even larger segment now, has been very timid about the 
idea of independence. It is this timidity that the French have played upon 
to keep Polynesia ~ightly bound to France .. 
It is tempting, however, to imagine that French Polynesia might have 
gone the way of the majority of French African territories that voted lIyes ll 
in 1958. The African territories have evolved towards independence, while 
retaining close political, economic and cultural ties with France. The 
ironic fact, however, is that evolution, and the more violent process of 
achieving independence in Algeria, meant that French Polynesia had to remain 
French--to provide De Gaulle with a site for testing his atomic bombs once 
it had become politically impossible to continue testing in the Sahara. 
The decision to transfer testing to the Pacific may well have been taken 
back in the late 1950's, although it was not announced to the Polynesians 
until 1963. The announcement was in the form of an offer that could not be 
refused, a Faustian bargain by fiat. The bomb, after all, was a matter of 
national defense, and hence beyond the concern of the Polynesians and the 
limited powers of their local assembly. The bomb was really a blessing, 
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argued De Gaulle. It would bring prosperity: the metropole would build 
magnificent new port facilities and undertake other infrastructure improve-
ments; the metropole would assume a larger share of the government budget 
and would institute many new educational and social programs; and most of 
all, there would be thousands of well paying jobs for the people. 1 
While it might be an oversimplification to argue that opposition to the 
bomb--and to continued French rule--was bought off, the promise of massive 
French expenditures and increased economic opportunities was not lost on the 
Polynesians. I recall one day in 1962 when I was attending a meeting held 
in a rural Tahitian district. French administrators were explaining to the 
Tahitians a proposal to have that district, and other districts, transformed 
into municipalities with locally elected mayors and other officials, and local 
budgets. Horrified by the thought that this change might mean new taxes, one 
old Tahitian got up to declare that such a change might be for the good, but 
only so long as "Mama France ll kept footing the bill. 
Even then, in 1962, the Tahitians were enjoying a new prosperity in large 
part paid for by metropolitan taxpayers. Since then the French have, in a 
manner of speaking, kept their side of the atomic bargain. The tremendous 
inflow of funds with the bomb has transformed the territory. Agriculture and 
fishing no longer form the economic base. Most French Polynesians live off 
wage labor--and now most jobs are on Tahiti, the central island of the five 
archipelagoes that make up the territory. Out of a total population for French 
Polynesia of almost 150,000, almost 100,000 live on that island. Tahiti has 
become virtually one urban-suburban unit, focused on the port town of Papeete, 
lSee Bengt and Marie-Therese Danielsson, Moruroa, Mon Amour, Penquin 
Books, Ringwood, Australia, 1977, for a detailed account of the French testing 
program and accompanying political maneuvers. 
., 
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the adjacent airport and nearby military facilities. 2 Despite attempts to 
promote tourism and other industries, the testing program is the largest 
single employer for the Tahitians, the backbone of the economy--at least 
according to Paul Cousseran, Francels High Commisioner in French Polynesia. 
Listen to what he has to say: 
1I0ne can be intell ectua lly for the CEP [Atomi c 
Testing Program, ed.], or one can be intellectually 
against it. But the fact is that this country lives 
off it. Three thousand, two hundred families do so 
quite directly, not counting Polynesian military 
personnel. Abo~e all, thousands of families live off 
it indirectly.11 
But salaries paid to Tahitian personnel employed in the testing program 
is only part of the picture. Especially now that the main construction phase 
of the testing program is over, France must keep a high level of funds flowing 
into the territory in order to keep the urban proletariat and the wage econ-
omy afloat. Official government transfers, excluding salaries for military 
personnel and civilians employed in the testing program, probably now exceeds 
$1,000 per capita per annum. 
Two hundred years ago Diderot used Tahiti to argue that man could live 
free from the constraints then binding French society. However ironic it 
might seem, this island, so beloved by European philosophers and romantics, 
has now been transformed into a IImilitary-urbanll complex. But that fate is 
not so unusual for Pacific islands. Hawaii has pioneered this type of develop-
ment, followed by Guam, the Marshalls and now, it would seem, the Northern 
~1arianas. This is a new type of dependency, different from the commercial 
arrangements of more typically colonial and neo-colonial relationships. The 
2See Ben Finney, Polynesian Peasants and Proletarians, Shenkman, Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1973. 
3pacific Islands Monthly, April, 1979, p. 7. 
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islands are not significant producers of export crops for metropolitan profit, 
nor are they great markets for metropolitan industrial goods. Their contri-
bution to the mother country is to provide real estate for military bases and 
testing facilities for exotic weaponry, with the rent paid by French taxpayers 
and their American colleagues. 
Have the French Polynesians kept their part of the atomic bargain forced 
upon them? Have they remained loyal to France? In a manner of speaking, yes. 
At least 99.9 plus per cent of them have not openly revolted. There are two 
main political persuasions among the French Polynesians: a Gaullist one and 
a Nationalist one. The Gaullists are in the minority, although at times with 
the aid of French voters, including thousands of soldiers and o.ther metropo.l-
itan testing personnel encouraged to. vo.te in local' elections, they have se-
cured control of the local assembly. Needless to. say, this group has basically 
supported the bomb and continued French rule on the basis that it is best fo.r 
the Polynesians. While it might be easy to say that these pro.-French po.li-
ticians are but representatives of the local bourgeoisie desirous of maintain-
ing their privileged position, many would appear truly to believe that it wo.uld 
be economic suicide for the territory to sever its ties with France. 4 
They are, of course, encouraged in their sentiments by French logic. Let 
me continue the quote from Francels High Co.mmissioner, Paul Cousseran: 5 
"I have said before and I repeat: Independence 
is no.t the problem faced by this co.untry. On the 
co.ntrary its problem is its dependence. Po.lynesials 
pro.blem is that it does no.t pro.duce what it co.nsumes, 
it do.es no.t pro.duce the mo.ney necessary to pay for \'/hat 
it co.nsumes, so. someo.ne must always be fo.und to pay in 
its stead. II 
4This paragraph simplifies a much mo.re complex situatio.n. 
Tagupa, Po.litics in French Polynesia, New Zealand Institute of 
Affairs, Wellingto.n, 1976. 
5pacific Islands Monthly, April 1979, p. 7. 
See, Wi 11 i am 
International 
24 
The Nationalists, who command the majority of French Polynesian voters, 
and who have been in power most often during the last decades, have not fol-
lowed a particularly radical strategy since the defeat and imprisonment of 
their leader Pouvanaa. Occasionally, their leaders threaten to ask for 
independence. Mostly, however, they have occupied themselves with protesting 
the bomb and asking for internal autonomy, or self-government, within the 
French community. 
The Cook Islands next door provide the Nationalists with a model for a 
type of self-government that greatly loosens the political ties with the mother 
country but which does not cut off the flow of metropolitan funds. The Cook 
Islanders elect their own legislature, and their own premier, and pretty much 
run their own country under New Zealand auspices. Yet they are New Zealand 
citizens, can travel freely to New Zealand and work there, and continue to 
receive sizable grants from their obliging metropole. Tahitian Nationalists 
generally prefer this model to the one with which the French threaten them 
should they seek independence, the model offered by the French treatment of 
their former colony of Guinea. When Guinea voted "no" in 1958, the French 
government pulled out and cut Guinea off without a sou--at least that is what 
the French love to tell the Polynesians, adding that, should they wish to be-
come independent, they will go the way of Guinea. 
The Nationalists' protests against the bomb would appear to have been in 
vain. Protests and boycotts by New Zealand and Australia have, in contrast, 
been effective in helping to force the French to explode their bombs under the 
atoll s south of Tahiti rathe-r than in the atmosphere above them. Nor have the 
Nationalists' pleas for self-government been effective. The French have given 
way here and there, but never enough to make a crucial difference. A very sick 
Pouvanaa was returned early to Tahiti from exile--to die at home. And, in 
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response to the most radical protest staged by the Nationalists--an occupation 
of the house of assembly in 1976--the French promulgated a new statute which 
appeared to give the Polynesians a measure of autonomy. The Governor was re-
placed by a High Commissioner, and a local cabinet with a kind of local prime 
minister was instituted. However, it has not taken long to see that, despite 
these changes, the French are still firmly in control. 
~Jill French Polynesia always be an Overseas Territory, a dependency of 
a European country half a globe a\</ay? Will the French Polynesians continue 
to be split between those who wish to stick tightly to France and those who 
ask for self-government but do not wish to totally renounce France and her 
aid? Jean-Claude Guilliband, the foreign affairs editor for Le Monde, has 
gone on record as unsure of a continuance of the pattern that has prevailed 
over the last decades. In his 1976 book, The Confettis of Empire, devoted 
to the tiny fragments of the French Empire scattered around the world, Guilli-
band ends his chapter of French Polynesia with the sentence: IITahiti reserves 
some surprises. 1I6 
Actually, four years earlier in 1972, there occurred a seemingly sur-
prising departure from the pattern of Tahitian acquiescence. Six young Tahi-
tians, including one part-American who had served with the U.S. Marines in 
Vietnam, stole a supply of munitions from the French army to start a rebellion. 
Though caught in two weeks, they immediately escaped from jail, were recaptured 
and then promptly instigated Tahiti's first prison riot. Although this affair 
has its comic opera aspects, the idea of stealing arms from the French to 
foment a rebellion is definitely something new in recent French Polynesian 
hi story. 
6Jean-Claude Guilliband, Les Confettis de l'Empire, Editions du Seuil, 
Paris, 1976, p. 155. 
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In 1977 came further surprises. A self-styled commando group calling 
themselves liThe Blood of The Ancestors ll dynamited Tahiti's waterfront post 
office. Then, apparently choosing their victim at random, they shot a French 
Metropolitan in his bed. The alleged organizer of this commando group, lithe 
serpent in the Polynesian paradise ll according to the French prosecutor, was 
a relative of the late leader Pouvanaa, a 42-year-old Tahitian with the im-
probable name of Charles Ching. Ching and the other four who actually did 
the dynamiting and shooting were tried and found guilty this past February. 
But they did not pass up the opportunity their public trial offered to 
publicize their cause. Aided by Tahitian politicians ca·lled to the witness 
stand, Ching, especially, succeeded so well in airing Tahitian grievances 
against the bomb and continued colonial rule, that the Le Monde reporter 
offered the following comment which I will use to close this brief talk: 
IIThis trial which was supposed to be about 
terrorism has become a trial of colonialism. Do these 
words, in 1979, mean something to the French of France 
who for the most part have ignored 'the crumbs of their 
empire ' ?117 
7Le Monde (weekly edition) 1-7 February, 1979, p. 7. 
From Atoll to Federal Agency: The Politics 
of Feeding People 
by 
Dr. Craig J. Severance 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Hawaii at Hila 
Hilo College 
Last year at this conference I recommended that we study the contemporary 
Pacific in terms of the various interests of the major powers and the depend-
encies these interests create. My purpose was to call for a rethinking of 
our conventional wisdom about development assistance (Severance, 1978). I 
was trying then, as I am today, to play devil IS advocate and suggest that cer-
tain assistance programs may have the long term effects of creating dependency 
and underdevelopment. These assistance programs may also control the emerging 
political elite. 
Today, I will describe briefly the apparent effects of United States food 
assistance programs on a small outer island community called Piis-Losap in 
Truk District, Micronesia. The community is on a low coral island, one thou-
sand feet across and three thousand feet long, set on an enclosing reef along 
with some other islets for the resident population of about 230 people to 
exploit. This is not paradise as we westerners have stereotyped Pacific 
atolls, but it is home; home to both the residents and to their relatives 
who form a dispersed squatter community on Moen, the District Center of Truk. 
It is a home that could probably feed the whole community if enough labor 
and skill were applied. 
This month normally marks the opening of the breadfruit season, and taro 
must now be conserved. In every cookhouse, however, large pots of white rice 
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or a sugared flour soup are prepared and eaten with small amounts of canned 
mackeral or meat. Fresh bread and ship biscuits are either eaten with USDA 
peanut butter or dipped in sweetened coffee. The central taro patch lies 
dormant, and some breadfruit remains unpicked since over half the younger 
men are visiting or are working in Moen, or they are subsisting on basic 
educational opportunity grants in Hawaii or on the mainland. Those who re-
main on the island and subsist on a combination of local, purchased and free 
government food are primarily the very young and the very old. 
It is tempting to think of this island as a self-reliant community which 
could survive if shipping were cut off. Micronesian atolls face occasional 
resource fluctuation due to typhoons which may simply damage the breadfruit 
crop or may be devastating. With the exception of true isolates (Alkire, 
1978) whose populations seem to level out below carrying capacity, most atoll 
communities have survived such IIdisaster ll in the past by maximizing their 
social and economic ties to neighboring islands so that food can be moved to 
people and people can be moved to food. 
The high population density of the island I describe (2000+ sq. mi.) is 
due to its closeness to the high island complex of Truk and the fact that 
Truk's resources may legitimately be considered part of Piis-Losap's ecosystem. 
After the 1907 typhoon canoeloads of fermented breadfruit were sent out from 
Truk. After recent typhoons, including Pamela in 1976, shiploads of USDA food 
have eventually arrived. The canoe response time in getting local food to the 
atoll seems often to have been quicker than the response time for ship-trans-
ported government food. and now they have outboard motorboats for even faster 
shipment of larger quantities of local foods, although the total volume of 
food is still greater when the ship comes in. 
People living here have always been pragmatic and have readily adopted 
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new customs and new technologies. Their response to the federal feeding 
programs has been to view them realistically as a new resource to be 
exploited. We, and they, may therefore ask whether such programs will con-
tinue to be available to feed a now rapidly expanding population, or whether 
they are temporary inputs on which the people are already too dependent. 
There are three major programs which have reached the atoll: the school 
lunch program, various increments of typhoon relief food, and the needy fam-
ilies feeding program. Unlike the elderly nutrition program which made an 
abortive attempt to utilize local foods in Truk lagoon (Borthwick, 1978), 
these programs provide the standard USDA surplus commodities. The school 
lunch program, begun in the nineteen sixties, has additional support for school 
cooks' salaries from DHEW Title III funds. It usually provides a noon meal 
for elementary students on days when school is in session. Occasionally, a 
small amount of the leftovers on students' plates reaches family members, a 
traditional and adaptive pattern. I believe that this program may well have 
the side effect of reducing the need for local food production among those 
family units that continue to have a good balance of younger male and female 
labor as well as among those family units which now face labor shortages. 
Typhoon relief food is distributed to the various islands on the basis 
of population size and varying damage estimates. The food is presumed to 
allow the population to remain at home and to rebuild more quickly. Studies 
of other islands indicate that such aid can speed the rebuilding process if 
the aid is immediately forthcoming and if it is adjusted to a realistic assess-
ment of needs that includes adequate communication from the local community 
(Marshall, 1976; Brady, 1978). Naturally, each island in a damaged area is 
in political competition with other islands for its share of the overall re-
lief pie. Indeed, the size of the relief obtained (usually counted in numbers 
I I , 
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of bags of rice and flour) seems to have become a measure of the political 
effectiveness of individual leaders or brokers at the island and district 
levels. 
One impact of the typhoon relief and needy families food on the island 
community I have described, and perhaps on other communities as well, has 
been a reduction in the degree of solidarity and sharing cf both lctbor and 
resources between members of the traditional, descent-based, land-holding 
groups (Severance, 1976; Borthwick, 1977). Typhoon relief food was originally 
divided equally among such groups in a manner similar to feast contributions. 
Since 1970, however, the food has been divided equally among household heads 
who no longer need to submit to the authority of elders in their land-holding 
group. These elders traditionally managed the group resources for all by 
regulating consumption. 
It is worth asking whether subsistence production of local foods has 
actually declined with the fairly regular increments of typhoon relief food. 
One observer has argued that "disaster welfare frequently acts, itself, as 
an agent of disaster by nurturing long term risks through short term remedies" 
(Torry, 1978). In ecological jargon this is gaining stability at the expense 
of resiliency. 
The new needy families feeding program is much more easily questioned 
because of its size and political implications (Latham, 1973). This program 
began last October in Truk only (although Ponape has petitioned for it) and 
is supposed to end in September. All families qualify on the basis of main-
land guidelines for case income and, to my knowledge, no attempt was made by 
those in the district government who requested the program to estimate the 
value of subsistence production as a part of family income. Each family 
(averaging seven persons) is receiving two and one-half tons of food for the 
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year. It is widely recognized in development circles that food aid can 
operate as a disincentive to self-reliant development {Isenman & Singer, 
1977}. A justification for such programs is that they may temporarily free 
capital used for import consumption so that it may be applied to local in-
vestment in development. Justifications for the needy families program in 
Truk seem to include the freeing of family cash supplies and the provisioning 
of the outer island communities so that net inmigration to Moen would be 
reduced. 
Report of a survey done by Xavier High School students on Noen indicates 
that some of the freed cash is spent on meat supplements and some on luxury 
items. Contrary to statements by those who support the program, the report 
indicates that subsistence production in fishing has drastically declined 
(Ki s te, n. d. ) . 
The nutritional impact of these programs is difficult to assess although 
rates of reporting of infant malnutrition in Truk Lagoon are increasing. 
Ironically, Ambassador Rosenblatt's recent statement that it was basically 
a United States decision not to commence any new federal programs may have 
taken some pressure off those politicians in Truk who do not favor the needy 
families program (Rosenblatt, n.d.). Continuation of the program was an issue 
in the recent election in Truk. A resolution by the Congress of ~licronesia 
(and the Congress of the Federated States) effectively states that federal 
programs should support the goals of self sufficiency proposed in the UNDP 
Indicative Development Plan, while an ensuing resolution by the Congress of 
the Federated States of Micronesia states that these programs should even be 
frozen. 
Yet, it is significant that the government of the most densely populated 
district has been able to obtain the needy families program, an obviously 
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popular program that has gained its proponents some political clout. If 
termination of the trusteeship will mean that block grants will be divided 
by the Congress of the Federated States so that each district government can 
then purchase the particular federal programs it IIneeds ll then such a depend-
ency generating program may be a dangerous precedent. 
We observers and the Trukese may question whether the United States grant 
monies might have a greater return in the long run if they are spent on some-
thing other than surplus food. The decisions to implement the needy families 
program were made at various levels in a multicultural bureaucratic hierarchy. 
Although it is easy to stereotype bureaucratic hierarchies, anthropological 
studies of them suggest that they are quite variable. The flow of information 
and resources as well as the decision-making process may vary from level to 
level, as well as between bureaucracies (Arensberg, 1978; Whyte, 1978; Wallace, 
1976) . 
In order to gain more complete understanding of the impact of United 
States policy (Ilon, 1978) on local communities, we need to examine carefully 
the linkages between the municipal and district governments and the Congress 
of the Federated States of Micronesia. Linkages between these levels and 
regional and Washington offices must also be considered along with a cultural 
understanding of the way individual actors perceive each other and each others' 
needs. This can be done by a methodology that Laura Nader has called IIstudying 
Upll by means of a IIvertical slice". Obviously, a better understanding of pol-
icy impact and policy implementation can only come from detailed study of the 
flow of both information and resources up and down. 
If members of this small atoll community truly have come to depend on 
and trust in continuing access to USDA food in the same way that they have 
always had access to the surplus subsistence resources of Truk, their local 
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needs must be adequately communicable to the top. However, these needs must 
also not conflict with any perceived needs of competing federal agencies. 
In addition, requirements of various agencies should be mutually adjusted 
so that the needs of local communities at the bottom are given fair 
consideration. 
At a time when self-reliant development and eco-development are becoming 
the new buzzwords, I suggest that programs which improve local agricultural 
and fisheries productivity may provide greater long term adaptability for 
atoll communities than temporary and massive inputs of surplus food. The 
choice of assistance programs should be left to the Trukese. The politics 
of such choice become more difficult when free food distribution provides 
power and votes to local politicians. 
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Dependence and Independence: Kapingamarangi Atoll and 
a Central Bougainville Community Compared 
by 
Dr. Michael P. Hamnett 
East-West Culture Learning Institute 
East-West Center 
The purpose of this paper is to explore a topic which has been given 
considerable attention in the academic literature, in the popular press and 
in conversation: DEPENDENCE. 
The word has been in common English usage for years, but its application 
to political and economic relations as an analytical tool was first made by 
South American economists in the 1960s. Basically, those who write about 
"dependence" or "dependency" assert that the political and economic dependence 
of the less developed countries of the world on the more developed countries 
of the world is a result of colonialism and, in the post colonial world, for-
eign assistance and development efforts. "Dependence" is used as an explana-
tion for why some nations of the world have not followed the expected model 
of capitalist development. 
"Dependence," in this sense of the word, was first used as an analytical 
concept by academics working in the Pacific Islands in the early 1970s (see 
Ogan, 1973; Bedford, 1977; Brookfield, 1975). These writers, like those in 
South America and Africa (eg. Fanon, 1967 and Mannoni, 1964) have applied the 
concept not only to relations between nations, but to the psychological state 
of individuals in a colonial situation (Ogan, 1973) and relationships between 
small island groups in the pre-colonial Pacific Islands (Bedford, 1977). 
I do not claim any great knowledge of the development of underdevelopment, 
nor the psychological impact of colonialism. However, I do see some of the 
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explanations presented in the dependency literature as useful in trying to 
make sense out of my observations and experiences in two island communities: 
Kapingamarangi Atoll, a Polynesian outlier in Micronesia; and Atamo village 
in Central Bougainville. I spent a total of twenty-seven months on Kapinga 
as a Peace Corps Volunteer and twenty-two months in Atamo village on Bougainville. 
I, along with others who have spent time in Micronesia and in Papua New 
Guinea, share a concern for the political and economic future of these countries. 
The dependence of Micronesia on the U.S. was a concern of mine while there from 
1969-1972, and it is a concern of mine now as I am sure it is of many people. 1 
Micronesian writers in the 1970s (eg. Heine, 1973: 35-36 and 1977; Uludong, 
1973) have bemoaned Micronesia's dependence on the United States. Heine, in a 
seminar on moral issues related to political status in Micronesia, states that 
"f,1icronesians are the victims of dependence ... (and that they) have never put 
themselves in a subservient position" (1973: 35). 
I would like to share some of my observations on the question of depend-
ency in the two communities in which I lived. This is not a detailed analysis 
of the presence or lack of a dependency relationship between Papua New Guinea 
and more industrialized countries or between Micronesia and the United States; 
it is, rather, an assessment of the relationships between two small island 
communities and the "\'Jorld beyond." It is a brief summary of what I believe 
people in those two communities thought about those relationships and an attempt 
to relate these observations to what has been written about dependency. I 
will provide comments on the implications of the attitudes of people in these 
communities for the political and economic future of these communities and, 
perhaps, for the countries in which they are located. 
lIt is ironic that people in the late 1960s and early 70s expressed con-
cern over the political implications of dependence of Micronesia on the U.S. 
and only now are we academics "analyzing" the situations in these terms. 
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Kapingamarangi is a Polynesian outlier in the U.S. Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands. The atoll has a land area of .426 square miles. The 
population of the atoll in 1972 was about 411, although there were at that 
time between 500-600 Kapingas living on Ponape. 2 The atoll population grew 
most of its own food (taro, breadfruit and coconuts) and depended heavily on 
fish. There was a coop and a small trade store with sales of approximately 
$20,000 per year, of which about two-thirds was rice, flour, tinned meat and 
fish, biscuits and sugar. There were four full time government employees 
(all school teachers), and the total income from outside jobs was $8,100. 
Copra income averaged about $7,500 per year. Migration to and from Kapinga 
vias by ship which called at Kapinga every six weeks to three months. 
Atamo is a village in an inland valley in Central Bougainville. 3 The 
land claimed by Atamos, when I was there, was about 27 square miles, much of 
which was mountainous. The island of Bougainville is a high volcanic island 
off the coast of Papua New Guinea. With "small Buka" to the north, it is 
.about 130 miles in length and 30 miles wide. Atamos, like Kapingas, grew 
almost all of their own food but ate primarily sweet potatoes and greens. 
Opposum, pork, fresh water shrimp and almonds were feast foods, and there was 
very little protein in the everyday diet. A store opened in the village while 
we were there, but sales were only about $200 per month. Atamos had access 
to a store at Manetai Mission eight miles to the north and to stores in the 
towns of Kieta and Arawa. Atamos produced copra and cocoa for sale with a 
total annual income of about $8,500, much of which went to local processers. 
2Kapingamarangi has been described in the anthropological literature at 
some length by Emory, 1965; Buck, 1950; and Lieber, 1968a, 1968b, 1970. 
3The Atamo community has also been described elsewhere. See Hamnett, 
1977 and 1980. 
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Movement into and out of the Atamo community was more frequent than on Kapinga, 
but there was almost no permanent out-migration. 
Kapingas were contacted by Europeans in the late 1870s, whereas, Atamos 
had no contact until the mid-1920s. Although Kapinga, an atoll over 400 miles 
from the nearest high island, would seem more isolated, Kapingas have had 
much more contact with outsiders than Atamos. Kapingas were converted to 
Christianity in 1919, whereas most Atamos did not become baptized until after 
World War II. Kapingas have had resident Europeans in their community since 
the 1880s, whereas Atamos had no long-term foreign residents until the 1970s. 
This background provides some indication of the similarities and differ-
ences of the two communities in terms of their environment and contact history. 
One more difference bears noting: Kapingas, before contact, viewed themselves 
as dependent on their gods for survival. They experienced periodic droughts 
which occasionally resulted in drastic reductions in their meager food re-
sources and in starvation. Atamos, as individuals and as small residential 
units, saw themselves dependent on their spirits for success in feasting, pig 
raising and--in the case of potential political leaders--for followers. There 
was no single community as on Kapinga and hamlet groups of from one to ten 
households competed with each other, but survival was never an issue for those 
who lived in the Atamo valley. 
Political and economic dependence and independence were discussed in both 
Kapingamarangi and Atamo during my stay with each community. The political 
status of Micronesia was being talked about in 1970 and 1971 on Kapinga, and 
the political status of Bougainville and Papua New Guinea was being discussed 
in 1974 and 1975, while I was in Atamo. When I was on Kapinga, people said 
they felt the United States must continue to take care of them. They said 
the German and the Japanese had looked after them in the past and, after World 
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War II, lithe American Navy took over care of Kapingamarangi II (Chief Tuiai 
quoted in Emory, 1965: 27). Whil e Europeans, Ameri cans and Japanese i ntro-
duced new goods, and provided shipping, health car"e and education, drought 
relief has probably played a more significant role in influencing the Kapingas' 
view of their colonial masters. 
Prior to contact, the Kapingas' gods were responsible for maintaining 
an adequate supply of food for the atoll (Emory, 1965: 199-399). Drought, 
tidal damage and high winds were seen as expressions of the displeasure of 
the gods and food relief was seen as a sign that good relations with the gods 
had been restored (Emory, 1965: 200). The chief priest was held responsible 
by the community for drought and other disasters; and even after European 
contact aliki (chief priests) were deposed for failing to bring relief from 
disaster. In many \,!ays, the gods have been replaced by representatives of 
the colonial powers. They not only provide goods and services unavailable 
before contact, but also give food relief in times of disaster. Kapingas 
have sought to maintain good relations with those who IItake care of them,1I 
(Lieber, 1968: 2) and they do not appear to be bothered by it. 
Atamo presents a stark contrast to Kapinga in a number of ways: It is 
a high island community with more than adequate land to support the population. 
Atamo has never been threatened by natural disasters and, prior to European 
contact, the population was dependent on its gods for success not survival. 
Atamos have had much less contact with Europeans than Kapingas, although I 
don't think Atamos have been any more or less exploited. 
Atamos have been actively involved in efforts to create an independent 
Bougainville since the mid-1960s. They strongly resented the attitudes of 
Australian Administration officials and plantation managers prior to Papua 
New Guinea's independence (see Bedford and Mamak, 1974). When Conzinc Rio 
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Tinto began developing the copper mine twelve miles south of Atamo in 1969, 
Bougainvillians, including many Atamos, called for the independence of Bougain-
ville from Australia. In 1975, just prior to Papua New Guinea's independence, 
Atamos and other Bougainvillians called for secession. The catalyst for se-
cession was the National Government's refusal to give Bougainville the capital 
work funds it requested. Bougainvi11ians demanded that they receive the roy-
alties on copper from the Bougainville Copper mine in lieu of funds from the 
National Government, or they \AlOuld break with Papua New Guinea. 
Atamos talked about secession as a moral issue (cf. Burridge, 1960). 
Their desire for independence from Papua New Guinea was not simply a matter 
of keeping the wealth from the copper on Bougainville for Bougainvillians. 
It was also a question of the inequality in status that the control over 
II Bouga i nvi 11 e' s II wealth by "outs i ders II represented. Atamos have never been 
satisfied with being controlled by or dependent on anyone. 
The contrast between the Kapingas' attitudes toward dependence and their 
relationship with the world beyond their community and the attitudes of the 
Atamos are striking. Atamos seemed to feel independence was important. Ka-
pingas had either come to accept their plight as a community dependent on, 
and controlled by, colonials, or they had had a dependency orientation prior 
to contact and substituted foreigners as their gods. 
Atamos joined other Bougainvillians in their efforts to break ties with 
Australia and Papua New Guinea. It could be argued that Atamos were willing 
to become subservient to a Bougainville National Government or a Government 
of the North Solomons. However, the ideology of independence was used in the 
early 1970s when Atamo and five other villages broke with the Kieta Local 
Government Council to achieve greater local autonomy. 
I have implied that the attitudes of Atamos and those of Kapingas toward 
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dependence and independence are a result af differences in their ecalagical 
vulnerability. The Kapingas are in an enviranment which praduces adequate 
faad far a small papulatian, but the atall is subject to. natural disaster. 
The Atamas live in an abundant enviranment and are nat subject to. fluctuatians 
in their faad supply. While this may be an aver simplificatian, it appears 
there is a relatianship between ecalagical vulnerability and attitudes taward 
dependence. 
The twa cammunities have had very different colanial experiences. The 
Kapingas have had a langer histary af Eurapean cantact than Atama, and their 
cantact has been mare intense. It cauld be argued that because the Kapingas 
have interacted mare with calanials, and their interactian has been mare 
pas i ti ve, they have been mare wi 11i ng to. accept a dependency re 1 ati anshi p 
with their colonial masters. It cauld also. be argued that Kapingas have 
been affered so. much mare than Atamas in the way af material wealth that the 
Kapingas have been "bought-aff." While bath these arguments are plausible, 
I dan't think they explain the marked differences in attitudes af peaple in 
the twa cammunities. 
The U.S. may have 'I implemented pragrams in the 1960s ... designed 
to. make Micranesia dependent an the United States so. that the latter cauld 
maintain hegemany in the areas'l (Kiste, 1974: 197). Far the Kapingas, at 
least, the dependency relatianship has been accepted, and they did nat appear 
to. be suffering fram it in 1971, althaugh this may have changed since that 
time. Such a relatianship wauld, in my apinian,be unacceptable to. Atamas. 
This camparisan af the attitudes af these twa cammunities sheds same 
light an the questian af whether a dependency arientatian is a characteristic 
af peaple who. became calanized (Mannani, 1964) ar a praduct af calanialism 
(Fanan, 1967). In same cases, it may be a praduct af bath, as Ogan (1973) 
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claims it is for the Nasioi of Bougainville. The comparison presented in this 
paper would indicate that Pre-European contact populations may have had dif-
ferent attitudes toward dependence before colonial rule. 
What are the implications of the attitudes reported here for the political 
and economic future of Atamo and Kapingamarangi? The disdain Atamos feel for 
dependence, if it continues, will probably result in a lack of political 
stability. If this disdain is held by other Papua New Guineans, as I suspect 
it is, maintaining a unified Papua New Guinea is going to be difficult. 
If Kapingamarangi people now feel they can, or ought to, remain dependent 
on outsiders, they are likely to opt for a continued close association with 
the United States. For them, the security of their present relationship with 
the Trust Territory Administration and its relationship with the United States 
may be more important than greater economic and political autonomy. Whether 
the Kapingas still feel that security is more important than independence, I 
do not know. Whether other rural communities in Micronesia also feel that a 
continued dependence on the United States is acceptable, I cannot say. 
One further point bears mentioning. If there is a relationship between 
a community's attitudes toward political and economic autonomy and the abundance 
of that community's resources (or at least a stable, ample supply of resources), 
the future of island nations will probably bring an increasing acceptance of 
dependence. With the population of Pacific Island nations growing at a very 
fast rate, the food resources available are going to decline, and the willing-
ness of people to become dependent may increase. 
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United States Policy in the South Pacific 
by 
Mr. William Bodde 
Director, Office of Pacific Island Affairs 
U.S. Department of State 
United States participation in the establishment of the South Pacific 
Commission marked the beginning of the post-World War II political involve-
ment of the United States in the South Pacific. In 1947 the wartime allies 
with colonies and territories in Oceania signed the Canberra Agreement which 
established the SPC to promote economic and social development in the islands. 
The evolution of this institution reflects the political dynamics of the 
region. Over the years the Canberra Agreement has been amended and a body of 
practice has developed which makes the SPC more responsive to the island na-
tions and territories. It is symbolic that for some years now the SPC Secre-
tary General has been an islander. Now the recipient islands nations and 
territories determine the programs, priorities and allocation of the funding 
contributed by the members. Adapting to changing needs of the South Pacific, 
the SPC is engaged in such region-wide research efforts as the Skip-Jack Tuna 
Survey which will provide the islands with detailed knowledge of this key 
natural resource. 
The 1952 ANZUS Treaty is another example of the American involvement in 
the region following the defeat of Japan. ANZUS has become a useful tool for 
the United States, Australia and New Zealand to discuss common concerns, 
assess international and regional developments and coordinate policies in the 
region. 
In the period from the birth of the SPC and ANZUS until the present, the 
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region has undergone dramatic political change. Since 1962, Western Samoa, 
Nauru, Tonga, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu have joined 
the ranks of free and independent nations. They will be joined by the Gil-
berts (to be called Kiribati after independence) in July of this year and the 
Nevi Hebri des is expected to become independent in 1980. 
While these colonies and states were in the process of becoming independ-
ent, the French and Ameri can Territori es in Oceani a gained additti ona 1 autonomy 
and self-government. During the same period negotiations began about the 
future political status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. These 
political developments have taken place free of bloodshed, racial conflict, 
and great~power rivalry. In fact, decolonization in the South Pacific has 
taken place with the assistance and encouragement of the former colonial 
po'tJers. 
Since their independence, the island nations in Oceania have turned to 
regional cooperation as a means of solving common problems. For example, the 
South Pacific Forum was established in 1972 (among the independent and soon 
to be self-governing states in the region) to serve as the principal means 
for the South Pacific nations to discuss and coordinate regional policy. 
Some attempts at regional cooperation have been unsuccessful and there cer-
tainly has not always been a consensus among Forum members, but by and large 
the Forum has proven to be an effective political institution. 
In the first two decades after the war, U.S. policy in the South Pacific 
was confined to the SPC, ANZUS, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
(the United States became the administrating power by agreement with the 
United Nations in 1947) and the U.S. Pacific territories--Guam and American 
Samoa. However, the emergence of independent South Pacific nations, a desire 
on the part of the U.S. territories to playa greater role in their own 
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destiny, political pressure in Micronesia for a new political status and the 
proliferation of 200 mile fisheries zones all called for changes in U.S. 
policy towards the South Pacific. 
During this period the citizens of Guam and American Samoa began the 
journey down the road to self-government and now elect their own legislatures 
and governors. In the Trust Territory the Northern Marianas opted overwhelm-
ingly in popular referendum to become a U.S. Commonwealth upon the termina-
tion of the U.N. Trusteeship. Last year the remaining six districts in the 
Trust Territory voted in a constitutional referendum; four of them approved 
the constitution and will become the Federated States of Micronesia, the other 
two voted it down and will form their own separate constitutional governments. 
The United States is presently negotiating a Free Association Agreement 
with the three Micronesian entities which will give them control over foreign 
and domestic policy while the United States will retain responsibility for 
defense policy. We hope to sign The Agreement in the near future beginning 
a process which would lead to termination of the U.N. Trusteeship Agreement 
in 1981. 
In order to adjust to these new political realities we have made institu-
tional changes in our foreign policy establishment. A resident ambassador 
with an expanded staff has been assigned to Suva and also serves as the U.S. 
representative to the SPC. In Washington a Deputy Assistant Secretary in 
the Department of State has been given responsibility for Oceania and a sep-
arate office has been set up for the Pacific islands. We have also begun a 
modest aid program for the area to supplement Australian and New Zealand 
efforts. 
In addition to the organizational adjustments there have been other 
changes: increased contact with the political leaders of the region through 
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frequent visits, encouragement of a special role for Hawaii and the U.S. 
territories in relations with the region and efforts to develop a group of 
foreign service officers with specialized knowledge and expertise about the 
South Pacific. 
We have also begun the process of resolving the issue of U.S. claims to 
twenty-six islands in the South Pacific. The United States has concluded a 
Treaty of Friendship with Tuvalu in which the U.S. relinquished claim to 
four islands. In a U.S. settlement with the Gilberts, 14 islands in the 
Phoenix and Line groups will become part of the new Republic of Kiribati 
(pronounced Kiribas) shortly after the Gilberts' independence in July this 
year. 
Although efforts to establish a South Pacific Regional Fisheries Organi-
zation with the United States as a member have not yet been successful we are 
still hopeful of cooperating in the future with the South Pacific nations in 
the creation of an international organization to conserve, manage and exploit 
the marine resources of the region. 
We welcome and support the efforts of the State of Hawaii and the Ameri-
can Territories to forge closer links with the nations of the South Pacific. 
During the transition period we will foster closer cooperation between the 
Trust Territory and its South Pacific neighbors in preparation for post-Trus-
teeship status. 
Working together with the islanders we can contribute to a peaceful, 
secure and developing South Pacific. The United States will continue to 
support regional cooperation in the South Pacific. 
American Samoa--Gateway to Opportunity in the South Pacific 
by 
Frederick W. Rohlfing 
Director and Special Counsel 
Amerika Samoa Office--Hawaii 
First, some brief basic facts about American Samoa. There are seven 
islands in the Eastern Samoan group located about as far south of Hawaii as 
San Francisco is from the East coast. American Samoa is the only U.S. pos-
session south of the equator. Her largest island, Tutuila, is 18 miles long 
and six miles at its widest point. Of a population of approximately 31,000, 
over half are not American Samoans. 
Arable land is insufficient to support significant agriculture. Currently, 
American Samoa is primarily dependent upon U.S. government financial support 
and the continued operation of two major fishing canneries. The Government 
of American Samoa provides twenty-one and a half million dollars in direct 
salaries and twenty-six and a half million dollars worth of purchase, while 
the canneries provide five million dollars in direct salaries and fifteen 
point seven million dollars in purchases. 
Despite a seeming lack of resources, and its dependency on U.S. grants, 
American Samoa has significant economic potential that can be realized through 
the following means: 
1. The expanded exploitation of inshore and offshore fisheries and 
natural resources from the sea bed. 
2. An expanded visitor industry. The existing infrastructure needs 
improving. 
3. The development of a small scale industrial development and 
51 
52 
processing center, taking advantage of tariff breaks, low cost long leases on 
governmental lands and tax incentives, utilizing abundant natural resources 
from some of the neighboring island states--such as Western Samoa. 
4. Serving as a regional transportation, transshipment market and finan-
cial center for the South Pacific. 
5. Increasing import substitution through increased commercial and sub-
sistence agricultural production. 
To assist American Samoa in its development, the United States has made 
substantial contributions to building an infrastructure which can support in-
dustrial expansion. Among the infrastructure assets of which American Samoa 
can boast are the following: 
An international airport with a 10,OOO-foot jet runway. 
An extensive roadway system connecting most potential industrial sites 
by paved, two-way traffic access. 
A 25-acre industrial park including paved roads and utility hook-ups. 
A universal 12-year education system and a two-year college available 
to i nte t'es ted students. 
Territory-wide telephon~ availability with newly established satellite 
connection as of October, 1979. 
Broad-based telecasting and educational television. 
Water and electricity to all villages in the Territory. 
A deep-water industrial port superior to any other in the South Pacific 
(but which needs additional warehousing). 
A marine repair facility for major and minor boat repairs (which will 
be upgraded). 
A large medical facility. 
Solid waste collection and disposal system throughout the Territory, and 
a sewer system connecting most anticipated industrial sites. 
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There are many exciting things happening in American Samoa and the South 
Pacific--if youlve got a little vision and some patience. The area that ex-
cites me most is often called IIRegiona1 Deve10pment. 1I To appreciate what 
1111 be talking about, you need a map. Observe the Polynesian islands scat-
tered in a rough circle around American Samoa: Western Samoa, Tonga, Niue, 
Cook Islands, Toke1aus, Tuvalu, and French Polynesia. All of these micro-
states share constraints on their economic development associated with their 
s.ize and isolation from market, communication and industrial centers; diffi-
culties in competing with large areas that can produce similar products with 
greater economies of scale (in this league, Fiji is a major power); and for-
mer/existing colonial ties. 
American Samoa as a Regional Transportation Center 
Served as a domestic air route of the United States, American Samoa is 
the least expensive travel destination from the United States to the South 
Pacific. 
American Samoa has suffered from inadequate commercial air service since 
Pan Am cut its flights in the fall of 1976--eventua11y to two late night 
flights. A new day is just around the corner however, with the inauguration 
by Continental of five daylight flights from Hawaii to Pago every week starting 
in 3 weeks .. As important as the increased frequency between Honolulu and Pago 
is the resumption of direct service to Australia and the expansion of service 
to New Zealand. In addition, Fiji-based Air Pacific now has a direct weekly 
flight to Suva, Nadi, and Pago. South Pacific Island Airways and Polynesian 
Airlines provide other regional services, and Air New Zealand calls once a 
week out of Auckland. 
American Samoa also receives a significant volume of surface shipping. 
During 1977, the port of Pago Pago received over eight million pounds of 
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freight and mail and exported almost four million pounds. 
Most important to both Hawaii and Samoa is a reliable regular surface 
shipping service. Last fall Warner-Pacific Lines instituted a 6 weeks turn-
around schedule, but this has fallen apart. The next voyage, for example is 
now scheduled for June 10. This is a vital need that must be filled by pri-
vate enterprise. 
American Samoa as a Regional Market Center 
The Pacific islands have long suffered from high prices resulting from 
an inability to buy in volume. Wholesale markets are virtually nonexistent. 
Depending on the product, prices may vary as much as 100 percent or more from 
the cost of the same product in the United States, New Zealand, or Australia. 
For this reason, island consumers routinely circumvent local markets, buying 
directly from sources outside the region, thereby draining local economies. 
An acute need exists to bring the benefits of the wholesale pricing 
mechanism to the region. With the highest South Pacific concentration of 
U.S.-originated ships and aircraft, American Samoa can serve as a wholesale 
market center for U.S. and Hawaii produced goods. American Samoa can also 
serve as a distribution point. 
Additional warehousing, transshipment and merchandising capabilities are 
needed. 
American Samoa as a Regional Capital-Intensive Processing Center 
With a few exceptions, the island states in the South Pacific region do 
not possess all the production factors necessary to export products which can 
compete with similar products from other regions. In many cases, if island 
states consolidated resources, problems of scale could be handled so as to 
make projects viable or more profitable. This is one of the reasons for 
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Governor Peter Colemanls increased emphasis on American Samoals participation 
and leadership in regional organizations. In his vision, the benefits of 
American Samoals capital-intensive economy can be combined with labor-inten-
sive economies in the region. 
Under the Generalized System of Preferences, the United States grants 
special duty rates to developing areas, as well as to its own territories. 
All of the small island states in the South Pacific, including American Samoa, 
are eligible. However, eligible areas must add at least 30 percent value 
to products. There is also a provision allowing eligible countries and terri-
tories which are members of the same trade union to combine input for the pur-
pose of computing (or satisfying) the value-added requirement. 
The duty rate reduction offered under the GeneralizedSystem of Preferences 
however, is not always sufficient to make production worthwhile. Another 
avenue to be considered relates to the provisions of Headnote 3A of the Trade 
Act. Under Headnote 3A, U.S. territories may bring products into the United 
States duty free whenever 50 percent of the value of the product is added in 
the U.S. territory. Items which are particularly attractive for production 
under Headnote 3A are those with high rates of duty entering the United States. 
Regional Political Leadership 
A place as small and as vulnerable as American Samoa must have its wits 
about it when looking to the future. The people of American Samoa are thus 
very fortunate to have a man with the governmental background in the Pacific 
that Governor Peter Tali Coleman possesses. 
In the 15 months since hels taken office, together with aggressive and 
bright Lieutenant Governor Tufele Lila, Coleman has pushed American Samoa 
from being a reluctant and silent tail to the U.S. dog to the forefront of 
South Pacific and Pacific-wide regional activities. At the South Pacific 
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Commission conference in Noumea American Samoa took a strong leadership stand 
on civil aviation in the area which was critical of the major metropolitan 
powers functioning in the area--in particular the U.S. and Australia. In 
J~nuary, 1979, Governor Coleman took the lead again and invited top leaders 
from Tonga, Niue, the Cooks, Tuvalu, Western Samoa, and French Polynesia, to 
a meeting of what had been strictly a U.S. show--the Pacific Islands Develop-
ment Commission. Almost all came. In describing this meeting in a speech 
to the Hawaii State Senate, Governor Coleman hit these highlights: 
"We can work together constructively by lowering our 
shortsighted barriers to interisland trade and inter-
course; by encouraging private enterprise not by talk 
alone, but by direct measures; by reducing overlapping 
duplicatory services of regional air carriers; processing 
plants, etc. American Samoa has two major fish canneries 
in addition to prime shipping and airport facilities--it 
makes no sense to duplicate these facilities in Apia, 
Rarotonga or Funafuti. 
Joint Pacific island efforts on controlling immigration, 
agricultural disease and other threats to the environment 
will be more productive than individual efforts. There 
is no sense, too, in duplicating large capital facilities 
with high overhead--e.g., educational facilities, airports 
and major harbors. II 
Also bearing upon our future is the politicRl decision on future status. 
As a state, Hawaii is a fully integrated part of the U.S. but American 
Samoa is, as the lawyers say--an "inchoate" territory--unorganized and 
unincorporated. For you non-Constitutionalists, unincorporated means any 
territory to which the U.S. Constitution has not been expressly and fully 
extended. Unorganized does not mean we don't have "our act together," it 
only means Congress has not written an organic act to govern us as they did 
for Hawaii in 1900! Our political study commission is now reviewing alter-
natives, having just completed a trip to the West Coast Samoan communities 
and Washington, D.C. One of the major considerations in that study is how 
to obtain greater flexibility for American Samoa in dealing with all regional 
matters. 
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Conclusion 
American Samoa does not offer you a plumeria garden--but we do offer 
opportunity for those with vision and guts. The former sleepy, isolated 
islands--where the "Dukes" of Doonesbury played in the past--are coming of 
age, whether they like it or not and in my opinion will move more and more 
to the center stage of the South Pacific region. American Samoa is indeed 
America's gateway to the South Pacific, and the South Pacific's Gateway to 
America. 
Fa'afetai tele lava. 
Soifua! 
China as a Pacific Power 
by 
Dr. Michael R. Godley 
Department of History 
University of Hawaii at Hilo 
Hilo College 
Having attracted attention with a somewhat futuristic title, I wish 
to assure you that China is not about to become a IIpowerli in the Pacific 
islands region in the terms we usually think of. While her naval forces 
are expanding, they will not pose a challenge to the United States or in-
creasing Soviet presence in the area. Nor would China really be in a posi-
tion to out-do the Japanese should that nation, as is likely, redevelop as 
a seapower. What is more, for a host of geopolitical reasons, China will 
take a stance in her home waters and the Northwest Pacific long before she 
ventures into the South Pacific region which concerns the majority of us at 
this conference. And when she does so, her most concentrated efforts will 
be reserved for the waters adjacent to the South China Sea. Likewise, what-
ever technology Peking develops to exploit marine resources will be applied 
first to her own continental shelf and not to the ocean depths. Nevertheless, 
as if to emulate some old Taoist maxim, China's very lack of conventional 
strength is apt to prove of considerable leverage in the newly independent 
Pacific. At any rate, it is this theme that I wish to comment upon today. 
On her terms, China will be a factor in the region. 
In a recently featured editorial, People's Daily--the official organ of 
the party and government--affirmed China's determination to playa part in 
the South Pacific. 1 As might be expected, Peking portrayed the region as one 
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torn by Great Power struggle and particularly vulnerable to Soviet expansion 
and intrigue. But the author, in line with major changes in Chinese foreign 
policy since the Cultural Revolution, stressed China's commitment to support 
all Third World countries regardless of their social or political system. 
In an effort to combat Soviet--and American--expansion, Peking further urged 
regional cooperation and encouraged Australia and New Zealand to pursue an 
active role in the region. 
China's interest in the Pacific has, of course, grown up almost overnight 
together with the mushrooming new nations. In most cases, this may prove an 
advantage for Peking which seeks to play up her own semi-colonial past. More-
over, by supporting economic cooperation, cultural exchange and the exclusive 
economic zone concept, China has rapidly gained friends. But, it is her 
pledge to resist Great Power hegemonism which seems to have struck the most 
responsive chord. Before belaboring the obvious to tell you of the appeals 
and also the dangers of any Big Brother approach to peoples so long ensnared 
in dependency relationships, let me sketch the short history of China's rela-
tions in the area. 
The first hint of interest came in the fall of 1970 when Zhou Enlai 
offered his best wishes to a Fiji which had been promised independence. 2 Within 
two years, China had commenced diplomatic relations with Australia and New 
Zealand, entered the ping-pong era, and grown even more suspicious of Russian 
intentions. 3 By the closing months of 1975, a South Pacific strategy was al-
most fully developed. In September, Zhou announced China's intention to rec-
ognize Papua New Guinea and established actual relations with Fiji and Western 
Samoa in November. In each instance, Peking pledged to respect the sovereign-
ty and territorial integrity of the new nations while introducing what may 
well prove to be the most critical themes: along with their peoples, the 
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Chinese belong to the Third World and must, inevitably, share in the struggle 
against imperialism. 4 The strange yet important twist, however, was that 
the Fiji accord was signed in Canberra. But the logic of acknowledging Aus-
tralia's natural role in the region was made clear the following spring when 
Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser visited an aging Mao and later, heard Hua Guo-
feng describe China's growing fear of "the other superpower" and its Ilexpan-
sionist ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region." As Hua continued, "We are 
both concerned for the security of the Asia-Pacific region and opposed to 
the seeking of hegemony by any country or group of countries."S 
This strategy of supporting the regional powers as a means of thwarting 
greater opponents applied also to New Zealand. Prime Minister Robert Muldoon 
had, in fact, preceded Fraser in visiting Peking. 6 When the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives paid a call nine months later, the line had hardened: 
"Situated in the Asia-Pacific region, China and New Zealand are both naturally 
concerned That very superpower is stepping up its infiltration and ex-
pansion in this region. We are very glad to see that the government of Ne\'1 
Zealand and some other Oceanic countries are sharpening their vigilance against 
the superpower's expansionist ambition ... '.7 In the fall of 1977, when Brian 
Edward Talboys who was carrying several portfolios for Wellington arrived in 
China, the United States had returned to the picture of a Pacific caught be-
tween two contending global powers but, once again, the "social imperialists" 
received top billing. And the New Zealander could not miss the message that 
his country was expected to lead the movement against outside intervention. S 
For those who have followed Chinese foreign policy, Peking's dependency 
on the resolve of Australia and New Zealand, countries which have strong ties 
to Western Europe and America, is a dramatic shift of position but, as is 
usually the case, a change demanded by strategic considerations and explained 
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to the point of rationalization by the words of Mao. It was, therefore, 
understandable that the publicity surrounding Chairman Hill of the Australian 
Communist Party differed in content if not intent from that of his country's 
formal government when he turned up in Peking at the start of 1978. According 
to the Australian Communist organ, Vanguard, Chairman Mao's theory of the 
differentiation of the three worlds has now come to affect the course of revo-
lution in Oceania: second world countries such as those ruled from Canberra 
and Wellington can be counted on to unite with smaller nations on certain 
issues and, most critically, share in the struggle to redesign the international 
d t 1 d d . t' 9 or er 0 prec u e superpower omlna lon. 
Part of the third world by self-definition, China has been on the lookout 
for common interests and issues. 10 In the South Pacific area, the most obvious 
of these concern the sea. Throughout the various sessions of the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea which commenced in June 1974, China has con-
sistently supported the position of South Seas states. What has been at stake, 
according to Peking, has been nothing less than "a struggle to defend maritime 
sovereignty.l,l1 For her part, China has stood up for the 200 nautical mile 
exclusive economic zone, also pushed by the South Pacific Forum, and held out 
for full international control over the extraction of deep seabed resources. 12 
The goal, expressed in a recent issue of Beijing Review, while giving congrat-
ulations to the Gilbert Island Group upon its independence, is "all 6 million 
square miles of South Pacific waters under jurisdiction of relevant sovereign 
South Pacific States.,,13 Of course, with her own continental shelf to protect 
and disputed islands in both the East and South China Seas, the Middle Kingdom 
is concerned with more than either idealism or propaganda. 14 Nevertheless, 
China's own interests in keeping the rich and technologically advanced nations 
from exploiting ocean resources genuinely correspond with those of a region 
now riding a high tide of nationalism and can be used to foreign policy 
advantage. 
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Back in the 1950s and early 60s, other Third World countries were courted 
(and occasionally undermined) in an attempt to combat American encirclement. 
The principles of Peaceful Coexistence enunciated at Bandung in 1955 did make 
some friends in Asia, but courtship of formerly colonized nations took a back 
seat to the smoking rhetoric of paradoxically isolationist leaders during the 
Cultural Revolution. Once the Russians emerged as more than a sparring part-
ner in ideological dispute, and with U.S. rapprochement leading to United Na-
tions respectability, the early hints at a more positive form of world leader-
ship took root. Today, having dropped talk of the II rura1 areas ll spreading 
revolution to a North America and Western Europe prosaically described as 
IIcities of the wor1d,1I Peking has worked to create another United Front. 
This time, the principal enemy is the Soviet Union. 
According to one editorialist: liThe Developing Countries of the South 
Pacific region have strengthened their unity with second world countries in 
the struggle against hegemonism. 1I15 In the final analysis, however, the 
ability of all the nations in the area to resist plundering by outsiders 
depends on the viability of their own regional economy. For this reason, 
China has attached great importance to the South Pacific Forum and the 10ng-
term goal of some sort of Pacific Common Market. As a visiting delegation 
from Western Samoa learned in Peking in March 1977, China also offers the 
lure of economic cooperation. 16 New Zealand and Australia have already shown 
promise of becoming major trading partners with China,17 but Peking seeks 
commercial ties with far less lucrative markets. Indeed, the plan of attack 
sketched by the Chinese delegation before the U.N. Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific at its summer 1978, New Delhi meetings stressed trade 
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and the unity thus forged as critical factors in deterring further Great Power 
penetration. 18 Meanwhile, back in Oceania, the Chinese put theory into prac-
tice with the opening of a trade fair at Suva, Fiji. 19 
Clearly, Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Marais Fiji is a special case, 
or rather, the model for the relationships China hopes to establish throughout 
the area. Embassies have been opened, athletic teams have exchanged visits, 
and economic cooperation has been stressed. 20 A Peoplels Daily editorial 
welcoming diplomatic ties in the fall of 1975 pulled together the whole bag 
of foreign policy themes: 
We have always maintained that all countries big 
or small should be equal ... Both China and Fiji 
belong to the Third World. Our two peoples have 
suffered from imperialist aggression and oppres-
sion and have always supported and sympathized 
with each other in the struggle against colonialism 
and imperialism ... We firmly oppose hegemonism 
and power politics pursued by the imperialists, 
the superpowers in particular. 21 
A real clue to the strength of the relationship came later, in early summer 
1978, when Mara appeared in Peking for talks with Hua Guofeng and Vice Premier 
Li Xiannian. 22 But the most gratifying news did not become public until after 
the prime minister returned to Fiji where he announced that his government in-
tended to reject Soviet efforts to set up an embassy. Mentioning his recent 
trip to China, Mara was reported to have said that the Chinese were sincere and 
aboveboard while the Russians had only subversion in mind. 23 By the end of 
June, Fiji legislators concurred by an overwhelming majority which prompted a 
Chinese commentator to note that "Fiji does not want to become another Cuba." 24 
China was similarly pleased when Tonga, together with Fiji, turned down 
the Soviet vice minister and commercial attache who toured the South Pacific 
in 1975 offering aid in an attempt to establish fishing bases. 25 And Beijing 
Review provided coverage of an incident that Papua New Guinea would probably 
just as soon forget: the reported landing of "later-day tsarists" on an 
uninhabited island claimed by Somare's state. 26 
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Although Peking would like to build a Fiji-type relationship with Papua 
New Guinea, there are a number of considerations which have complicated the 
balance of power game. Indeed, the government in Port Moresby, responding 
to domestic criticism and always reluctant to give anti-communist Indonesia 
anything to become agitated about, has not yet given permission to either 
the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China to open embassies. Close 
to a decision in the spring of 1978, the whole matter has been deferred for 
at least a year. 27 It is not that Prime Minister Michael Somare has never 
played the China card. Fortuitously, the first foreign dignitary to arrive 
in China after the death of Mao, he was met at the airport by Hua Guofeng, 
flown to Hong Kong on a special Chinese jet, and apparently basked in the 
publicity given his infant nation by a Peking which emphasized its own affin-
ities with the Third World. 28 There has also been some exchange of cultural 
groups,29 and a steady, if small, parade of lesser governmental functionaries 
to rural China to observe the ways in which intermediate technology might be 
applied to agriculture in Papua New Guinea. What is more, the China trade is 
clearly on an upswing with Peking providing inexpensive consumer goods in ex-
change for copper, timber and cocoa. As one scholar of the area has noted, 
a China connection does offer Somare an opportunity to reduce his dependence 
on Australia and, despite some dangers, will undoubtedly experience controlled 
growth. 30 
Elsewhere in the region, China remains eager for new friendships. In 
the summer of 1977, a Chinese acrobatic troupe touring Western Samoa drew 
80,000 spectators during its stay.31 Even tiny Nauru's picture appeared in 
People's Daily32 and, when newly independent, the Solomon Islands were the 
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subject of a series of special articles. 33 Just last November, the Gilbert 
Islands had their turn. 34 In all these cases, the Peking press--so often 
the wellspring of diatribe in the past--was entirely objective even when it 
came to making reference to the colonial heritages. The virulent words are 
found elsewhere; these are directed not backward to the years before independ-
ence but toward lithe late-coming superpower II who, ~Jith fitting marine meta-
phor, "wild with ambition is stretching tentacles everywhere in the world. II 
According to these charges, the Soviet Union is using "every means to infil-
trate this region under the signboards Ichampion of national liberation l and 
Ifriendly cooperation. 11135 As a new and dangerous menace, this particular 
hegemonist must be excluded from the Pacific. 
Although there are some who think that the Chinese are secretly eager for 
American bases to remain in the Pacific,36 and this is probably true for colder 
waters, the use of one great power to check another will not sit well with the 
emerging nations to the South. At this stage, Peking does not seek a balance 
of power per se, but rather the restriction of Russian influence and maritime 
expansion. As long as American interests coincide, China will not press for 
U.S. ouster from either Micronesia or Samoa. The justification, as one Chi-
nese editorialist tiptoed across a sensitive issue: the Americans are really 
only protecting their vested interests; the expanding Soviets pose a different 
kind of threat. While the South Pacific region does constitute a "new area 
of contention for hegemony between the Soviet. Union and the United States," 
the present strategy calls for reliance on second world countries and unity 
amongst the islanders .. Ironically, China even has kind words for Japanese 
and West German aid which it believes has lito a certain extent contained the 
infiltration of the Soviet Union in the South Pacific." 37 Thus, all of the 
former colonial masters have a role to play. 
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It is certainly no coincidence that the Shanghai Communique between the 
u.S. and China was the first bilateral statement to contain an anti-hegemony 
clause: "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is 
opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish 
hegemony." Since then, the Chinese have attempted to get as many nations as 
possible to add their names to the list so transparently designed to discourage 
S . t . 38 OVle expanSlon. 
The warming of Sino-American relations has continued to carry the headlines. 
In December, the Australian prime minister and the general secretary of the 
French Communist Party, ordinarily strange bedfellows, found themselves quoted 
in the pages of People's Daily as supporters of U.S.-China friendship. While 
the first expectedly praised rapprochement as a step toward peace and prosper-
ity, the second suggested that closer relations with the Americans provided 
additional means to combat "any hegemonist movement in the Asia-Pacific 
region.,,39 Thus, while the United States as a superpower receives mixed 
reviews, Chinese leaders recognize the value of a powerful ally. It now 
seems strange to read the word "containment" in the Chinese Communist press, 
but the time-worn cliche is finding new spokesmen in Peking. 
As a consequence, China has been paying particularly close attention to 
the arms race and the relative strength of the competing superpowers. She 
is visibly alarmed over Soviet naval superiority and expansion into the In-
dian Ocean and the Northwestern Pacific. 40 Ironically, Peking has also noted 
that the U.S. 7th Fleet is no match for the Russians,41 and has quoted no 
1 ess an anti -communi st source than U. S. News and Worl d Report when stati sti cs 
published therein confirmed fears. 42 Balance of power is always a tricky 
business. Obviously, American strength is in China's interests insomuch as 
it restrains another more dangerous foe. Peking's long-term security can, 
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however, be obtained only through military modernization and, quite possibly, 
the eventual extension of her own power overseas. While this speaker believes 
that China's present effort to help Pacific nations resist exploitation is 
genuine, it is not improper to speculate about a time when China mcy have the 
technological and military wherewithall to stake her own claims in the South 
Pacific. 
There is no question that China, like Japan, is a potential giant in the 
area. At present the Chinese navy is large but almost exclusively defensive 
with little ability to project itself far from shore. 43 Although there are 
some who believe that China's 60 or more submarines (one or two are nuclear) 
could be used effectively in the insular Pacific, at least as a foreign policy 
statement,44 the present international situation will keep these vessels close 
to home in the defensive front lines. Most experts agree, however, that China 
has not been utilizing her full shipbuilding capacity. As we move into the 
1980s, she will be producing still more attack submarines and adding surface-
to-surface missle equipped combat ships which, if constructed to the standards 
of existing prototypes, will be very much up to date. 45 
The country's merchant marine is likewise expanding. When one counts the 
surprising number of ships registered under flags of convenience, China's fleet 
is second only to that of Japan in Asia and ranks 15th in global comparisons. 
By buying ships abroad (either new or mothballed in the case of much needed 
tankers), the Chinese can be expected to carry an even greater percentage of 
their Asian and Pacific trade in ships showing the Chinese flag. 46 Moreover, 
China's own shipbuilding industry has been producing dozens of seafaring trans-
ports in the 10,000 ton range since 1960 with ships four and five times that 
size beginning to be commissioned. 47 
Growth in all these programs may have some spin-off effect in the South 
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Pacific when, having upgraded her fleets, China may wish to sell or lease 
smaller coastal vessels suitable for inter-island work. Even more likely, 
Peking may provide fast, modern, patrol boats to friendly states as a token 
gesture in defense of their independence and against Soviet advances. 
Another area of likely Chinese activity is oceanographic technology. 
As she becomes more sophisticated at home, China will be capable of giving 
modest assistance. Ships with geological and scientific missions have 
already spent many days exploring the South China Sea and resource-rich 
northern waters, and on at least one occasion, two research vessels made a 
seventy-two day cruise crisscrossing the Pacific. 48 Nevertheless, as was 
the case with her sumbarines, it will be a full decade before Peking can 
divert equipment from areas close to home. The one exception to watch will 
be when China perfects a true ICBM and must test it over ocean swells. Then, 
as a perceptive scholar of the legal issues has already noted, it will be 
interesting to see the reaction in South Pacific capitals. 49 
China's most immediate concerns, would, however, appear to be in the 
South China Sea. The Spratly and Paracel Islands which were targets of 
gunboat diplomacy back in 1974, are currently of far greater geopolitical 
importance. Off the coast of rival Vietnam and astride major seaplanes, 
these dots of sand are crucial outposts from which China can observe Russian 
movements, explore for oil, base fishing ships and look beyond to more dis-
tant waters. 50 Within range of Hainan island's fighter squadrons, the 
islands--if they can be held--will enable the Chinese to draw a defense net 
at least partway to the Philippines. In order to consolidate claims, Peking 
has announced irregular ferry service from Hainan to the Paracels,51 and more 
activity should be anticipated. Rumors that the Chinese have finally started 
to construct landing craft fits this as well as the familiar Taiwan situation. 52 
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In any case, as events begin to enfold regarding all of the offshore islands, 
we will learn a little more about China's capabilities at sea. 
For the present, South Pacific nations have little to fear from the 
People's Republic and can expect Chinese support in international forums. 
They might, perhaps, keep another ancient Taoist saying in mind: "When a 
greater nation is humble before a lesser nation, it prevails over the lesser 
nation. II But, then, American policy makers might heed the same advice. 
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South Pacific Fisheries Politics 
by 
Dr. George Kent 
Department of Political Science 
University of Hawaii at Manoa 
All South Pacific territories except Tonga have been colonies of major 
powers, and they have been among the last in the world to gain formal 
independence. They are also among the last to feel the impact of Western 
technology and culture. Many face great stresses between rural-based tradi-
tional cultures and urban Western styles. 
The territories generally have low per capita incomes, high and in-
creasing levels of imports in relation to exports, high unemployment, high 
rates of emigration, high birthrates, exhausted agricultural lands, and high 
reliance on external aid. 
There are major commercial fishing operations based at American Samoa, 
Fiji, the New Hebrides, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Palau in 
Micronesia. These operations are all for the catching and processing of tuna 
for the export market, and all are based on joint ventures with American or 
Japanese firms, such as Japan's Taiyo, and the United States' H.J. Heinz 
(Star-Kist), Ralston Purina (Van Camp), and Castle & Cooke (Bumble Bee). 
There are also some export-oriented lobster and other fisheries, all far 
smaller than the tuna operations. 
Apart from the fish landed in the islands, large quantities of fish are 
also taken from the waters of the South Pacific by long distance fishing 
fleets of other nations, especially nations of the northern Pacific--Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, the United States, and the Soviet Union--without going through 
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bases in any of the South Pacific territories. 
Much of this fishing in the South Pacific is at the subsistence level, 
that is, for consumption in the family and in the village. Commercial fishing 
for domestic markets is seriously underdeveloped. None of the South Pacific 
territories produces enough fish to meet their own demands. They import very 
large quantities of fish, often more than half of the amount needed for local 
consumption. 
Problems 
Traditionally, people concerned with fisheries management have concentrated 
quite narrowly on improving the data base available to guide management deci-
sions on increasing production and on conserving the stocks by preventing 
overfishing. But there are a number of other issues which ought to be of con-
cern to those responsible for fisheries management. 
The largest importer of fish in the world is the United States, which 
imports more fish than all less developed countries combined. The overall 
pattern in the world's fisheries trade is that the product tends to flow from 
less developed to more highly developed countries. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that countries tend to import fish from countries that have lower 
levels of development than the countries to which they send their fish exports. 
This global pattern is the same as that found within nations. Fish, 
along with other foods, flows from the poorer rural areas to the richer metro-
politan areas. The reasons are the same. It is not so much that the needs 
are greater in the central, metropolitan areas as it is the fact that those 
in the center, being richer, can easily outbid those in the periphery for 
those products. 
While great quantities of fish follow this pattern, migrating via the 
trade routes to the more highly developed countries, there is also a very 
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substantial flow of fish in the opposite direction. Most of this fish is 
cheap canned mackerel from Japan. This import of fish occurs largely be-
cause of the lack of development of commercial fisheries for domestic mar-
kets in the South Pacific. The problem is compounded by the fact that the 
foreign exchange needed for the imports of food requires a strong export 
orientation to earn that foreign exchange. The imports of great quantities 
of food, rather than of other, more dispensible commodities, creates great 
dependency on, and thus great vulnerability to, outsiders. 
In many of the fishing operations in the South Pacific much of the 
employment is taken up by outsiders rather than by local people. The Palau 
skipjack fishery, for example, employs large numbers of Okinawans and Koreans. 
Land-based processing facilities are managed almost exclusively by expatriates. 
Whether for local people or outsiders, wage rates are extremely low, 
rarely much more than a dollar an hour. For example, in 1976 the average 
wage paid to Solomon Islanders working at the Solomon Taiyo cannery was 
U.S.$686 for the year. This was relatively good by local standards, but 
very poor from a global perspective. 
In not taking a fuller share of benefits, each low income worker who 
helps to furnish tuna sandwiches for distant Americans or Japanese or Euro-
peans in effect subsidizes their lunches. 
There are severe problems of malnutrition in the South Pacific, particu-
larly in Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, and the New Hebrides. This results 
in part from the decline of traditional fishing and gardening, and barter, 
and the trend toward urbanization and the increasing dependence on the money 
economy. The strengthening of local fishing for local consumption can help 
to meet this problem. 
78 
Comparative Disadvantage 
The economic doctrine of comparative advantage is part of the larger set 
of ideas advocating free trade and the division of labor. Supposedly, under 
a free market, where each party does what it can do best, and then trades with 
others, everyone is better off. There is high efficiency in production, and 
there is a good distribution of benefits. 
On examination, however, it appears that the argument does not hold in 
relation to the fishing industry in the South Pacific. The territories of 
the South Pacific, with very generous endowments of ocean, have no significant 
commercial fishing industry of their own. The benefits go p'rimarilY to those 
with the advantages of capital and technology rather than to those with the 
natural advantages. 
The system of free access to fishing waters leads to enormous inefficien-
cies, particularly to overcapitalization (excessive fishing resources chasing 
any given quantity of fish) and overfishing, leading. to depletion of stocks. 
~10reover, the effi ci ency of the free market system is an effi ci ency in the 
production of profit. The maximization of profit leads at the same time to 
relative inefficiency in the production of other values such as basic nutri-
tional value. 
Fisheries organized to maximize basic nutritional values would be organ-
ized very differently. For example, there would be practically no long dis-
tance fishing. Also, there would be far less concentration on "luxury" prod-
ucts, such as b1uefin tuna which can sell for three thousand dollars per ton, 
and more concentration on ordinary food fish. 
Evidence on the distribution of benefits from the fishing industry indi-
cates that it is of far greater benefit to the richer, developed nations which 
control the industry than it is to less developed countries like those of the 
79 
South Pacific. For instance, fishermen in California get more than twice the 
amount paid to fishermen landing the same species in Palau in Micronesia. 
While both price scales have been "increasing over time, the prices paid in 
California have been increasing faster. Thus, the gap between California 
fishermen and Palau fishermen is wide and \,/idening~ 
The growth of the tuna business has not led to a broadening of the range 
of the consumers of tuna. Instead, the rapid growth of production has been 
accompanied by a corresponding rise of consumption in the United States, 
Japan, and western Europe. The United States has been consuming an increas-
ingly large portion of an increasingly large total. Describing tuna as a 
luxury product may help to explain this, but it does not justify it. 
Regional Organizat~on 
The idea of creating a new fisheries management organization for the 
South Pacific first emerged at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum held in 
Suva, Fiji, in 1976. 
Originally, the organization was conceived by most Forum members as a 
means of coordinating policies with which to face the distant-water fishing 
nations. In this approach, the organization would amount to a ki~d of cartel, 
demanding higher royalties or licensing fees for access to the waters in their 
jurisdiction. 
As events unfolded, however, this understanding became muddled, largely 
because the United States was admitted to full participation in the negotia-
tions to plan the organization. The United States nominally represents its 
non-sovereign territories in the region, but in fact it spoke for its interests 
as a major distant-water fishing nation and as a major industrial fish pro-
cessing and marketing nation. 
The major divisive issue was the question of \'/hether highly migratory 
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species like tuna should be recognized as being included within the 200-mile 
zones of national jurisdiction over fishing. Fearing that the access of its 
distant-water fishing fleets might be limited, the United States has consist-
ently refused to recognize the inclusion of those species within the 200-mile 
zones. The South Pacific nations, however, argued that the highly migratory 
species must be included, especially since they are the only resource of sig-
nificant commercial value within their zones. 
It has become increasingly clear that the less developed nations of the 
South Pacific also have enormous differences among themselves. The larger 
nations of the region hope to exploit the fisheries resources themselves, 
while the smaller nations expect to benefit primarily from royalties and li-
cense fees obtained from outside fishing nations. 
And with many bilateral negotiations already underway, and the apparent 
eagerness of some nations to offer their resources to outsiders, the declared 
intention of the South Pacific nations to coordinate their negotiations with 
outside nations is open to question. As a result, the provisional agreements 
for a regional fisheries organization negotiated in Suva fell apart after 
acrimonious debate in Niue in September, 1978. However, they did agree to 
create a different organization, the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, 
which excludes the United States. 
It is possible that the nations of the region will find specific bases 
for cooperation in, rather than in spite of, their own interests. At the 
opening of the November, 1977, meeting in Suva, the Director of the South 
Pacific Bureau of Economic Cooperation said that "Some of the resources of 
the ocean belong to the region as a whole. They must be managed by the region 
as a whole, and the benefits should be shared by the region as a whole." 
Through progressive cooperation, it could be that the nations of the South 
Pacific will slowly move toward the increasingly explicit recognition that 
at least some of the resources of the region should be regarded as the common 
heritage of all of the peoples of the region. 
Media's Role in Pacific Islands Politics: 
A Roundtable Discussion 
Prepared by 
Dr. Thomas J. Brislin 
Journalism Program 
University of Hawaii at Manoa 
Roundtable participants: Dr. Thomas J. Brislin, moderator 
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Dr. Jim Richstad, East-West Communication 
Institute, EWC 
Ms. Leanne McLaughlin, Honolulu Star-Bulletin 
Mr. Floyd Takeuchi, Honolulu Star-Bulletin 
Mr. Kuar Singh, Fiji Sun 
Mr. Ngauea Uatioa, Atoll Pioneer 
Mr. John Griffin, Honolulu Advertiser 
The participants in this discussion agreed to focus on "a review of 
adversary and cooperative (developmental) press systems in the Pacific: 
problems and potentials." What emerged as a theme, from the roundtable it-
self, was a review of the barriers to efficient press coverage of politics 
in the Pacific islands. 
Such barriers range from the geographic realities of isolation, through 
to the traditional colonial flow patterns of news and finally to information, 
and government and social pressures, covert and overt, that suppress certain 
news items. 
A cross section of diverse Pacific press models was represented: the 
American adversary system by the Honolulu Advertiser and the (Guam) Pacific 
Daily News; the British adversary type by the Fiji Sun; and the government-
controlled developmental press by the Atoll Pioneer of the Gilbert Islands. 
Additionally, academic evidence of flow patterns in the Pacific press was 
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presented along with anecdotal remarks of specific incidents of press-govern-
ment conflict in Pacific coverage. 
No specific model of press-government or press-politics relationships 
\lIas advocated by the participants, but each speaker measured hi s or her expe-
riences with such relationships against the libertarian-free press ideals of 
the British and American journalistic heritage. 
Background 
In general, the Pacific has a tradition of the libertarian press system 
imported from Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. 
In a libertarian press system, the press is free to print whatever it wants. 
There is no prior restraint and the only post-publication constraints are 
those traditionally found in libel statutes, and, more recently, in official 
secrets acts. 
The libertarian press was spawned in Great Britain and its ideals, if 
not its practices, were imported to the thirteen American colonies as well 
as to the later Pacific colonies. 
From the libertarian system of the press came what has been called the 
"watchdog function ll of the press over government, establishing the adversary 
relationship between the two. 
The concept of the libertarian press, however, was predicated on the 
availability of a multitude of possible voices in the public forum. In such 
a multitude, the truth will bear out, and those members of the press dealing 
in prevarication and chicanery will fall by the wayside--sort of a media kin 
to Darwin1s selection theories: Only the fittest would survive, and in order 
to be fit, one had to deal with the truth. 
Contemporary economics have seriously undercut the IImultitude of voices ll 
foundation of the libertarian press concept. It is not nearly so easy, even 
85 
in a wealthy country such as the United States, to engage in an independent, 
successful press operation as it was when the American IIfounding fathers II 
applied the libertarian concept to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion guaranteeing freedom of the press. 
A similar absence of a II multitude of voices ll in the Pacific has cast 
doubt on the libertarian press there, as well. Such doubts have taken the 
form of stated desires for the press to take less of an adversary role with 
the government and more of a cooperative, or joint developmental role. 
As Pacific island states develop independence from colonial government 
control, they also lean toward a desire to gain independence from the imported 
concept of libertarian, adversary press. 
The developing independent states are producing leaders caught between 
the colonial tradition of libertarianism and the indigenous social leadership 
system of chiefs, nobles and elders. 
Such leaders are calling not for an abolishment of free press systems, 
but for more of a government-press partnership in determining the ideal pre-
sentation of government or political news which would best serve the social 
development of the state. 
Newspapers have, naturally, expressed little interest in such a partner-
ship, as what IIfreedomsll remain after such a press-government relationship 
would be academic, at best. 
Somewhere between the extremes of the purely adversary and the purely 
developmental, however, might lie a press system more suited to lithe Pacific 
Way. II 
Before any such determination might be made, however, an overview must 
be made of Pacific press systems and their attendant problems in covering 
governmental and political news, noted. 
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This was the purpose of the roundtable. 
The Dictates of Tradition 
Dr. Jim Richstad of the East-West Center's Communication Institute has 
conducted an extensive study of news flow patterns in the Pacific. The two 
year study noted the flow of news across the Pacific as well as the flow from 
island region-to-island region. 
Richstad reported IIclear evidence ll that news flows along colonial lines. 
The source of news of areas outside of the island's own region is mostly the 
main country of colonial ties, and that country is also the most common loca-
tion of the news events reported. 
Richstad reported that his study found livery little evidence of news 
across the (island regions). Very little about Tonga is reported in Saipan; 
there is little in Tahiti papers about the British or American (island) 
groups. II 
Exceptions to this pattern, Richstad noted~ occurred with news originating 
from Noumea about the South Pacific Commission meeting and from limited use 
of the PEACESAT regional news exchange experiment. 
This satellite system, Richstad noted, could cut across regional news 
flow patterns, and it did. The clearest example, Richstad said, was with the 
Cook Island News which is the only Pacific newspaper regularly printing news 
about other Pacific regions. All of the items in the Cook Island coverage 
come from the PEACESAT exchanges. 
liThe satellite can leap over traditional news flow patterns but hasn't 
been able to leap over political and other constraints,1I Richstad said. 
He cited the example of Fiji, which had to drop out of the news exchange 
because of sentiment by Fiji Post-Telegraph that the satellite was in unfair 
competition with commercial news services and common carriers. 
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Ownership patterns also tend to follow colonial lines, Richstad reported. 
In Guam, Saipan and even Hawaii, press ownership is centered off-island. In 
Fiji and Papua New Guinea, ownership is held in Australia. Along with owner-
ship in the metropolitan country comes the provision of international news 
through wire services from that country, such as the Australian Association 
Press to Fiji and Papua New Guinea, and United Press International to Gua~ and 
American Samoa. 
Within common colonially governed groups there might exist other news 
exchanges. Richstad noted a "newspaper exchange ring" with Fiji at the cen-
ter, trading newspaper copies as a news exchange method with other former 
British colonial islands. 
The traditional flow patterns do tend to dissipate with independence, . 
Richstad added. After a period of independence, he said, news patterns start 
changing to take on a "broader view. 1I He noted the Fiji Times, the Papua 
New Guinea Post-Courier and the Samoa Times were beginning to show a wider 
view of Third World countries and less reliance on New Zealand for both a 
source of news and for a location of news events to report. 
In discussing the consequences of the Pacific news flow patterns, 
Richstad said: 
"If countries are going to learn how to solve their own problems, one 
of the best sources is people with the same kinds of problems; and as long 
as the news--the international news system--is structured so these countries 
do not exchange news--that their news patterns go through a metropolitan 
country (which is the present pattern)--they're not getting that kind of news 
that can help them deal with their political problems. 
"In a way it's very dismal to look at, but in another way you can be 
very hopeful because the old pattern does seem to be breaking up: the 
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diversity of sources does seem to be available, the technology is readily 
available and in place to break the pattern completely, but there are still 
other problems (such as the political) that get in the way.'" 
liThe Weakness of the Press ll 
Even the established adversary press has its weaknesses in covering 
government. One of them is the fact that it is too often too lIestablished. 1I 
John Griffin, editorial page editor of the Honolulu Advertiser and a 
writer about South Pacific affairs through the editorial sections of his paper, 
compared the adversary press system with its alternatives by quoting Churchill 
on democracy: "itls the worst form ... except for all the rest." 
The American founding fathers saw the role of the adversary press as 
another check and balance on government, Griffin said, both in reporting 
governmental affairs and in its opinion function. 
The creator and carrier of bad news, however, have often been confused 
in the American mind. Griffin stated that the First Amendment is probably 
the least universally accepted part of the Bill of Rights, and that if a 
national constitutional convention were held, it \vould probably be the first 
to be deleted. 
Although the nature of island living tends to intensify press-government 
conflicts, Griffin said, there is still a danger of the creation of an "Esta-
blishment Press,1I one which is "too cozy with government or business ll and 
enters into a IIvoluntary developmental journalism syndrome" that overrides 
the adversary relationship. 
"Newspapers are in the establ ishment, let I s face it," Griffin said, "but 
if you get too far in and you lose whatever critical function you have, then 
you become like a paper in a communist state. 1I 
Griffin also commented on the relative "powers" of the press and of 
government: 
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"I don't think that the press anywhere is much of a match for government 
when it comes to I firepower. I He do get a voice, we do have a platform in 
American journalism. We can say what we want to editorially. We even have 
more access than anywhere else. But there's an awful lot of things that we 
miss--almost all of them by accident. 
If the public is going to be concerned about the power of the press I 
think they should be more concerned with our weaknesses. II 
The Adversary Sun 
Echoing some of Griffin's sentiments on the "Establishment Press" was 
Kuar Singh, stating that the Fiji Times, up until 1974, had been a benign 
chronicler of government events. But when the Fiji Sun, of which Singh is 
the chief reporter, was started, the competition forced the Times to report 
on developments beneath the surface of government and to take editorial 
stands often in disfavor of government policies. 
Singh is also a Pacific Island News Association-Fulbright (PINh) fellow 
attending the University of Hawaii Journalism Program. 
Singh heralds the introduction of the Sun as the beginning of "muckrak-
ing," or investigative reporting in Fiji--the most obvious function of the 
adversary press. 
But government information policies get in the way of this adversarial 
role, Singh reports, leaving stories unfinished in content but still published 
because of competition: 
"Some government ministries and departments prefer talking to the press 
only through the Ministry of Information--using it as a shield. To get replies 
through this channel, it usually takes a long time. Questions have to be 
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submitted to the ministry which then forwards them to the relevant ministry or 
department as the case might be. The questions, in most cases, sit on the 
tables of ministerial and departmental heads for some time before getting any 
attention. 
"SO , in this sort of a situation reporters are forced to go ahead with 
their stories from whatever information they have. By doing this there are 
accusations against newspapers of thriving on half-truths and not carrying 
balanced stories. The critics are mostly the ones who are supposed to be 
giving the needed information. So you could see that newspapers are tried to 
be made the scapegoat. II 
Another major problem Singh discussed was the intensely personal reaction 
by government officials to being criticized in the press. Although the 
libertarian-adversary model calls for such "muckraking," the social mores call 
for deference to be shown to such leaders: 
"(Investigative reports) greatly upset ministerial, departmental and 
organizational heads. For some, such stoties Istir up their sensibilities. I 
"In most cases, newspapers and their reporters become subjects of scathing 
attacks. There are threats of instituting drastic actions against them.1I 
Singhls retort, however, is that most ministers in Fiji have been in 
governmental service for some time and should now be used to the kind of 
public scrutiny of their behavior demanded by an adversarial press. 
Singh would advise journalists to be absolutely sure of the facts of such 
a story before going ahead with publication, but once confident of their facts, 
they should not be deterred by any sense of IIPacific sensibilities ll : 
"There are working journalists who are aware of the sensibilities of 
leaders in their areas. But when it comes to the question of choosing between 
this factor and the duty of a responsible journalist, they feel duty bound to 
select the latter.11 
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Singh1s main concern is for increased educational opportunities for 
journalists in the Pacific. Through expanded education, Singh feels, such 
concerns over the press-government relationship will be better handled, if 
not overcome. 
Development Press in the Gilberts 
The concept of a free press was brought to the Gilberts by Catholic and 
Protestant missionaries according to Ngauea Uatioa, editor of the Atoll 
Pioneer. Like Mr. Singh, Uatioa is a PINA fellow attending the University 
of Hawai i. 
After World War II, the government on Tarawa began publishing its own 
paper in Gilbertese. In the early 50s, Uatioa reports an English language 
edition of the paper was published, with its main readership among government 
personnel and educational institutions. 
The paper might better have been called a newsheet, according to Uatioa, 
as it was not until 1975 that the Gilbertese people saw what a newspaper 
should look like and should do. It was in that year that the Atoll Pioneer 
began to include such things as pictures, editorial comment and display 
advertising. 
The readership increased dramatically, Uatioa said, but the new format 
was short-lived. 
The government combined the Pioneer and the broadcast division into one 
information division directly run by government, discouraging many reporters 
who left their jobs. 
There is no IIfreedom of expression ll as such, Uatioa reported, as the 
press cannot, by authority, write anything against the government. 
Even though the information division was made into an independent authority, 
Uatioa said, there are still official strictures. Quoting from the rules of 
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government, Uatioa said: 
liThe Authority will under a duty-to observe impartiality in matters of 
political controversy ... or relating to current public policy; In the dis-
charge of their duty the Authority shall secure the exclusion of expression 
of their own opinion. 1I 
The language of this regulation is an archetypical example of the press-
government relationship of the development press. 
Guam, Micronesia: ~ense, Expanse and Social Pressure 
Attempting to cover an area as expansive as Micronesia from Guam has 
posed certain problems for the Pacific Daily News. Leanne McLaughlin, now 
an editor with the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, was city editor of the paily Ne~!s 
from 1977-79. From 1974-77 she was a political reporter for the Guam paper. 
Floyd Takeuchi, formerly editor of the Islander, Guam's Sunday magazine, 
covered several Micronesian events for the Pacific Daily News, notably the 
Marshallese constitutional convention and the repatriation of the Bikini 
islanders. Takeuchi is also presently ~/ith the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. 
McLaughlin recalled some of the difficulties of covering 11icronesia from 
Guam \l/ith essentially only one full-time correspondent, based in Saipan. 
Plans call for expanding t1icronesian bureaus to Palau and Ponape as well, 
McLaughlin reported. 
Although the Pacific Daily News is the only "universal ll medium in Micro-
nesia, its total circulation to the islands is less than 1,000, McLaughlin said. 
She did point out other island papers that serve their particular districts 
\llell, including the Marianas Variety and the I~arianas Commonwealth on Saipan 
and the Micronesian Independent in the Marshall Islands. 
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McLaughlin also noted that a second daily newspaper is scheduled to debut 
on Guam. 
Guam law provides for access to meetings of public officials and agencies 
as well as access to public records, McLaughlin said, but no such access legis-
lation exists in Micronesia where information is at times It~ithheld from journalists. 
Most of the news from Micronesia is the "official view" because of this 
lack of access, she said. 
McLaughlin also pointed out some of the tremendous communication problems 
in dispatching stories to Guam from Micronesia as well as limited flight and 
other transport schedules to travel from island to island to gather news on a 
timely basis. 
One bright spot she noted was the plans for journalism education at the 
Community College of Micronesia on Ponape which will train journalists to cover 
the islands .. 
Takeuchi reiterated the communication problems in Micronesia by recounting 
his difficulties in raising Guam by phone from the Marshalls while covering 
stori es there. 
Takeuchi also touched on the social pressures put on journalists not to 
report news of "internal problems" to other island districts or to Guam. 
Takeuchi himself was asked not to write certain stories about the Bikini 
repatriation. He also told of an incident on Saipan where police officers 
entered the paper1s bureau office and prominently displayed their guns while 
asking that a story not be printed. 
In another case, Takeuchi said, a Micronesian reporter feared for his 
personal safety in covering the Marshallese constitutional convention. 
Even for Micronesian natives, then, the pressures are great--and in the 
case of social pressures--even greater. 
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Summary 
From the participants' experiences, it can be concluded that regardless 
of the type of press system in operation, there are problems involved in 
covering government adequately. 
Where the press and government come into an adversary relationship, the 
conflict is often intensified because of the closeness of island living. 
While much of the Pacific press is primarily adversarial, it does not 
operate in the impersonal context of metropolitan nation newspapers. 
ihe p~ess ill t1e fJacific is still growing, still developing as are the 
island states in which it exists. Richstad's 1973 IIDirectory of the Pacific 
Press" pointed out that over half of the newspapers listed had not been in 
existence before 1965. 
But journalism handles development \'.Jell. It thrives on what is II new ll 
as a basis for what is IIne\'Is.1I 
In maintaining the adversarial role it has taken by tradition, the Pacific 
press will undoubtedly continue to arouse and accept conflict with the govern-
ment as a vI/ay of 1 ife. 
Summing up the continuing press-government relationship in the Pacific 
Islands Communication Newsletter, Robert Keith-Reid, a former PINA fellow and 
chief reporter for the Fiji Times echoed the opinions aired by the partici-
pants at this roundtable: 
"In coming years, Pacific Island journalists, native and expatriate, with-
out being subservient, will have to develop a style of operation that sees all 
the news, good and bad, get into print, yet making some allowances for Pacific 
Island sensibilities. 
"They will have to learn how to get local leaders to accept criticism 
cooly and with the realization that a free press must often be cruel to be 
kind. II 
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The Pacific and the Law of the Sea 
by 
Dr. Scott Allen 
Assistant Director, Law of the Sea Institute 
University of Hawaii at Manoa 
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure to have the 
opportunity to speak with you this afternoon. I recognize that you have 
reached the latter part of a long and stimulating day of speakers. I am 
reminded of a statement of Adlai Stevenson under similar circumstances: 
1I~1y job this afternoon is to speak to you, and yours is to listen to me. 
I hope I finish my job before you finish yours. II 
I would like to speak to you briefly about the relation of the Pacific 
Island nations to the law of the sea. Under international law, each of these 
new nations, some of them having no more than 7,000 citizens, as Mr. Bodde 
has indicated, have all of the rights, privileges, and duties of a sovereign 
nation. They are free to recognize other states or to withhold recognition. 
Each has a vote in the United Nations, the same as the United States. They 
can make treaties and abrogate them. They can collect taxes and tariffs, 
and they can regulate their trade. They can admit industry, and they can 
nationalize it if that is their wish. They can establish armed forces and 
navies. They can declare war or they can decline to make war. 
Today these islands, which once were isolated by long distances over 
vast oceanic wastelands, are now bound tightly together by the same oceans. 
The oceans give them similar advantages and similar problems, and from these 
grow similar attitudes and ways of dealing with the rest of the world. 
Because of the rapid gro\,/th of customary international law of the sea, 
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each of these nations has a twelve-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile exclu-
sive economic zone over which they exercise their sovereign jurisdiction. 
The problem: while the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference has been 
deliberating since December 1973 on a comprehensive rule of law for the oceans, 
the present and foreseeable state of that law is one of rapid change, ambiguity, 
and a degree of unpredictability. Thus, there is no binding and authoritative 
agreement on what the exclusive economic zone is and what it is not. No one 
can define what precise rights and jurisdiction attach to it. Does it confer 
control over transit? Under what conditions are entry and overflight limited? 
Is it subject to advance permission, in much the same way as the ICAO (Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization) Convention regulates flight over the 
territori alsea? Or, as some say, is it really more 1 i ke the hi gh seas? 
The eminent scholar of international law, Dr. Choon-ho Park, tells a 
story about two truck drivers on a bridge over the Yalu River, one Korean and 
one Chinese. The bridge is only one lane wide,and one of the drivers will 
clearly have to back up. They are at an impasse. The Korean takes out a copy 
of the Sunday edition of the New York Times and carefully reads it from cover 
to cover. At length he is finished. He puts it down. The Chinese driverasks, 
"May I borrow it?" 
This is illustrative of the current state of the l.aw of the sea negotia-
tions. Delay is a very human negotiating tactic. In a bureaucracy it is 
usually far easier to delay or to say IIno" than to assent to basic change, and 
basic change is what is now being proposed--and accomplished--in the law of 
the sea. 
From 1608 and Hugo Grotius' Mare Liberum to President Truman's continental 
shelfproclamatTon of 1945, the law of the sea has changed very slm'lly. One 
might venture to say that there has been more change since 1945 than in the 
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previous three centuries--change driven by advancing technology. Here we 
have a classic case of cultural lag, in which mankind's rules for regulation 
of ocean activities have consistently lagged behind the need. Let us be 
clear: technology is not at fault. The problem is in the ability of human 
institutions to derive viable rules and policies for healthy implementation 
of that technology. 
Recently the headlines have been full of the accident at Three Mile 
Island, and this case is illustrative. Here there was no basic technological 
fault. The technology works. The fault lay in the human organizations which 
failed to control adequately that technological power, and which, once an 
accident had occurred, were unequal to the task of adequate timely response. 
The problems were in policy, in law, in bureaucracy. 
We face many repetitions in the Pacific as we test the interface of 
ocean development and oceanic law, politics, economics, technology, and 
resource management. 
The Pacific, which we have always thought of as a vast place, is now 
walled in by a continuous line of 2DD-mile economic zones--zones in which 
the legal and practical implications are still unclear. Indeed, if the con-
ferees at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea should fail to 
achieve a comprehensive agreement, these zones--as well as the international 
straits of the world on which so much of our energy supply depends--may well 
be the subject of many unilateral claims. We are approaching a period in 
which there is a great danger of rapid and unpredictable change in the law 
of the sea. 
Unpredictability defeats efforts at ocean development. In every area, 
the cultural lag reappears: In fishing, the techniques are well known, but 
full usage of the resource is limited by lack of agreement on regional fishing 
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regimes. In deepsea mining, the industry tells us that the technology is 
ready, but that investment and implementation must await clarification of 
international agreements and legal issues. We have already alluded to the 
uncertainties of access and passage through the economic zones, which may 
affect surface and air transportation. In the area of energy, the tropics 
have special opportunities in a variety of new technologies such as ocean 
thermal energy conversion, floating platforms for coal or nuclear power 
plants, and other uses of solar energy, as for food production; but in many 
cases the rules for regulation of these new techniques will take a long time 
to derive. Consider, for example, the difference between our current fishing 
tradition,based on free access to an open hunting territory, and the require-
ments of open ocean mariculture. Who has the right to harvest II farmed II fish? 
In the final analysis, development--whether on land or at sea--comes 
doltJn to specifics. Specific solutions must be found for specific problems, 
and generalizations will not serve to solve the intricacies of cultural lag. 
The issues are often complicated by the logical precedent set for one case 
\'Ihich fails to ameliorate a following case. More likely than not, complexity 
is going to be our lot in this field. In solving problems of development, 
there are always trade-offs, and agreement requires consensus and compromise. 
How is such consensus to be achieved? 
In the case of oceanic societies, there is a built-in corrective device 
It/hich uses the great adaptability of oceanic commerce and industry as its 
operant conditioner. To use an analogy from John Craven, Director, Law of 
the Sea Institute, early sea traders making their first commercial contacts 
with unknown societies no doubt left their goods on the beach. If the response 
was friendly, and if the goods were rewarded with suitable exchanges, a trading 
pattern was established. But if the goods It/ere taken without reward, and the 
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sailors eaten to boot, that society was thereafter avoided. The first oceanic 
societies developed, if they were responsive, into great trading societies 
such as Sidon and Tyre. The others were forgotten. 
Today we no longer leave goods on the beach. We have exchanges of views, 
trade conferences, visits of merchants across oceans, etc. To solve the 
institutional problems, we try methods such as the United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea. But here, as in the past, if the goods are taken with-
out suitable exchange, oceanic societies will adapt as they have always adapted. 
The Law of the Sea Institute is dedicated to the principle that the 
greatest potential for present and future oceanic societies can be achieved 
by encouragement of this adaptation process. To that end, the Institute 
serves as a neutral and objective, interdisciplinary and international forum 
in which ideas and information can be exchanged on matters concerning the law, 
the politics, the economics, and the technology of the sea. Further, we have 
a faith that this sort of consensus building, based on the free exchange of 
ideas, works. 
Summary Remarks 
by 
Dr. Donald M. Topping 
Director, Social Science Research Institute 
University of Hawaii at Manoa 
To call these remarks a summary of the conference is presumptive, since 
it implies that all of those in attendance have forgotten what was said, while 
I somehow remembered. It will be better to think of my comments as one person1s 
impressions of some of the things that were said, as well as some of the things 
unsaid. 
Before going into the content area of the conference, I will echo Carl 
Daeufer1s second call for a Pacific Islands Association. Anyone interested 
should get in touch with him. It may be that such an organization already 
e~ists de facto through the Pacific Islands Newsletter and the Pacific Islands 
Interest Group which meets irregularly, but frequently, for the main purpose 
of meeting with travelers from both sides of the Pacific representing a wide 
range of interests. Anyone wishing to be put on the mailing list for either 
the newsletter or the meetings just fill out the green sheet, or get in touch 
with the PIP office. 
Mr. Hideto Kono, Director of the State of Hawaii1s Department of Planning 
and Economic Development, and formerly a high ranking official of one of 
Hawaii1s famous multinational corporations, Castle and Cooke, opened the con-
ference on Friday evening with an overview of the State of Hawaii1s role in 
the emerging Pacific scene. 
His remarks were basically a summary of a recent OPED publication titled 
IIHa\lJaii and the Other Pacific Islands,1I the title of which is already becoming 
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a catch phrase. Only recently has the State of Hawaii begun to identify itself 
with the lIother" Pacific islands, rather-than as an extension of Los Angeles 
or Tokyo. 
Mr. Kono's theme was that Hawaii stands ready to help show the way to 
successful development in the other Pacific islands, especially in the areas 
of: 
a. Agriculture 
b. Tourism 
c. Alternative Energy Sources 
d. Communications 
e. Free Trade Zones. 
There now exists the need to build on these, and more, e.g., cultural exchanges. 
Mr. Kana reminded us of the existence of the Pacific Islands Development 
Commission, whose membership includes the four governors of the American flag 
property in the Paci fi c (Ha\>/a ii, Ameri can Samoa, Guam, Northern r~ari anas) , 
and whose function is to IIpromote. II He \'Jent on to suggest the need for a 
Regional Development Commission, but the statement of purpose remained unclear 
as well as its relationship to the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation 
(SPEC) . 
~1r. Kono's talk failed to include one rather important aspect of Ha~Jaii's 
new role as a fellow/sister Pacific Island. That is, the image of Hawaii and 
the Hawaiians in the eyes of those Pacific Islanders to whom Hawaii is offering 
the helping hand. For example, the following: 
1. Unresolved Hawaii land claims against State and Federal governments. 
2. State sanction of continued bombing of Kahoolawe. 
3. Token Hawaiian representation in the State government. 
4. Generally low socia-economic status of Hawaiians, Samoans, and 
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Tongans living in the state. 
5. Low level of support for Polynesian cultural matters (e.g., museum, 
Hawaiian language instruction.) 
6. Minimal support (1/2 position) for the Pacific Islands Studies 
Program at the University of Hawaii. 
7. Use of Hawaiian Islands as a storehouse for armed nuclear warheads. 
It would appear that the State of Hawaii needs to get its own house in 
better order before making overtures to the "other" Pacific Islands, whose 
citizens are well aware of the history of exploitation of the Hawaiian people. 
The day following Mr. Kono's speech, Mr. Fred Rohlfing, Attorney General 
for American Samoa, presented his vision of American Samoa's role in the 
Pacific. Not surprisingly, Mr. Rohlfing, a Hawaii-born lawyer and erstwhile 
politician, sees American Samoa as ready to take a leadership role, following 
the pattern set forth by Mr. Kono, in the development of the emerging Pacific 
states. 
According to Mr. Rohlfing, American Samoa is already prepared to playa 
central role in regional development. The requisite infrastructure is already 
there: island-wide roads, electrification, sewage and water; satellite commu-
nications; deep water harbor; international airport; island-wide television 
reception; and two malodorous fish canneries as a basis for further industrial 
development. 
In addition to the already existing infrastructure, American Samoa now 
has its first elected governor, Mr. Peter Tali Coleman, who, since his election 
in November, 1978, has been working to establish closer personal connections 
with other Pacific Island leaders. 
The American Samoa game plan is set. All the pieces are in place. The 
big question is: Why doesn't it work? 
106 
Not mentioned by Mr. Rohlfing is the question of incentive of the people 
of American Samoa. In spite of all the appropriate conditions for economic 
development in American Samoa, why do the people continue to leave the island 
in droves for Honolulu, San Diego, and other Samoan communities on the "'lest 
coast? 
There are, of course, no easy answers to this question, but one might 
consider the nature of the development of the highly touted infrastructure in 
American Samoa, which, in fact, is alien in every respect, and was developed 
with minimal Samoan participation. The infrastructure as described by Mr. 
Rohlfing is an alien concept, funded by alien capital, and built by alien labor. 
Is it any wonder, then, that it has not worked well in American Samoa? Could 
one expect other Pacific Islands states to want to plug into a non-working 
system that has failed to provide economic development for the people of Amer-
ican Samoa? 
Although it was not mentioned by Mr. Rohlfing, there may be a para 11 e 1 
beb/een the American Samoan style of development and the highly criticized 
dependency programs in ~1icronesia. 
Dr. Ben Finney's portrayal of the state of affairs in French Polynesia, 
an area that gets little attention in the English language media, described a 
ne\'1 type of colonialism, characterized as "military" colonialism. In this 
relationship the metropolitan power is neither extracting resources nor ex-
ploiting the population as targets for consumer goods (although a good bit of 
the latter is going on in French Polynesia). Rather, in the case of French 
Polynesia, the colonial power is basically paying a reasonably cheap rental 
fee for an atomic shooting gallery. 
One cannot help noticing the parallel here between Mururoa and the 
Kwajalein Missile Range, with the attendant problems generated by a highly 
artificial (and inflated) economy, and massive population shifts to the 
centers of Papeete and Ebeye in quest of the western bank note. 
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Dr. Finney also described past and present movements in French Polynesia 
for independence. Earlier post-war demands, under the leadership of Pouvanaa, 
~Jere for independence. These were subdued by draconian measures on the part 
of the French government. ~1ore recently, one hears demands for i nterna 1 
self-government and more autonomy, which the French are willing to consider. 
Political activists, such as Charlie Ching, are still carrying the banner 
against French colonialism, and see the promised new form of self-government 
as the same old game with the same old rules and the same old players. Only 
the names have been changed. 
Are the political rebels in French Polynesia having any effect on devel-
opments there? The fact that the March issue of the Pacific Islands Monthly 
carried Charlie Ching's picture on the cover may be some indication. 
Two anthropologists' views on the question of developing dependency 
relationships were presented by Drs. Craig Severance and Michael Hamnett. 
Dr. Severance, speaking from his work on Piis-Losap atoll in the Truk 
District of Micronesia, concluded that, all things considered, federal largesse 
is detrimental to an atoll society. In particular, federal assistance through 
food and make-work programs serves as a disincentive to self-reliance. 
In addition, Dr. Severance observed a clear breakdown in the social order 
of Piis-Losap resulting from the introduced food distribution system. i.e., 
equal portions per capita, which stands in marked contrast to the traditional 
system of distribution by rank. It \'Jas also pointed out that the question of 
continued federal assistance programs in the Truk District has complicated 
local politics, in that some political candidates, in their bids for public 
offices, promised continued government welfare programs. 
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The new U.S. position on terminating federal programs will ·probably 
damage some political careers anc foster· disillusionment. Could this be 
construed as a tactic similar to that described by Dr. Finney, where the 
French, on leaving Guinea, tore the phones off the wall and ripped water 
pipes from the ground? 
Dr. Hamnett's comparison of a Polynesian (Kapingamarangi) and a Melanesian 
(Atamo) society raises an important ideological question. If Polynesians, as 
he claims, are prone to dependency, as a result of traditional and environmental 
factors, does this place a special responsibility on the donors? Is it moral 
to knowingly create dependency when the recipient is happy to receive? 
According to Dr. Hamnett, the Melanesians he lived with stressed independ-
ence in all phases of life. To them, dependence was a shameful state, one to 
be avoided at all costs. On the other hand, the Polynesians of Kapingamarangi, 
have always been content with a dependency relationship, whether with the gods, 
the missionaries, the traders, or the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 
Who is to say whether the dependency relationship is good or bad? A happy 
dependent society may be preferable to a frustrated but independent one. And 
maybe somewhere in between there lies the possibility of a happy medium. 
In the area of geopolitics, Mr. William Bodde and Dr. Michael Godley spoke 
of the positions of two of the world's super powers, the United States and the 
People's Republic of China, and their recent, but growing, involvement in the 
Pacific area. The level of activities on the part of both countries is not 
large, but it is visible. 
Both countries seem to be more or less content with the status guo, as 
long as the Big Bear is kept at bay. Both countries seem content with the 
concept of strategic denial--long an unspoken policy in Micronesia--with spe-
cific reference to the Soviets. 
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The U.S. has recently been negotiating with Tuvalu, the Gilbert Islands, 
and the Cooks over the legitimate claims of twenty-six disputed islands. 
While the U.S. is prepared to relinquish all claims of ownership--most of 
them having been based somewhat weakly on the provisions of the Guano Act--
Uncle Sam still insists, as in the case of Micronesia, on "defense rights," 
or the right to defend. However, no one has yet defined the need for defense. 
Are the Russians likely to invade Funafuti, Tarawa, or even Canton 
Island? Or is the defense right another term for strategic denial? 
Dr. Godley pointed out that China is taking a very humble approach in 
the Pacific, and suggested that the U.S. might well do the same. 
The theme of Mr. Bodde's talk was that the U.S. is doing exactly that. 
The panel discussion on "Media's Role in Pacific Island Politics" dwelt 
largely on journalism as a relatively new form of communication in the Pacific, 
which faces many problems as it develops. 
The most pervasive problem, as outlined by Dr. Jim Richstad, is that of 
the continued pattern of news flow along the lines of communication established 
during colonial times. There is still little movement of news across those 
political lines. Newly independent countries, according to Dr. Richstad, tend 
to take a somewhat broader view of the world, and attempt to garner and dis-
tribute news from other Third World Countries; however, the ties to the mother 
country remain dominant. 
PEACESAT has helped transcend the lingering political boundaries, but 
several local governments have prohibited the redistribution of news by the 
local press, especially in those areas where the newspaper is owned and oper-
ated by the government, as was reported by Mr. Ngauea Uatioa, Editor of the 
Atoll Pioneer (Gilbert Islands). Although a ne\'i law (January, 1979) was 
passed in the Gilberts to grant more independence to the press, the situation 
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there is still described as restrictive. 
The need for an adversary press system was stressed by Mr. John Griffin, 
of the Honolulu Advertiser, and repeated by ~1r. Kuar Singh, of the Fiji Sun, 
\·!hich nO\,1 offers competition and an alternate voice to the long-establ ished 
Fiji Times. Without such an adversary system, journalists run the risk of 
"joining the team, II either of business or of government. 
Ms. Leanne McLaughlin reported on the forthcoming development of journal-
istic competition in Guam with the beginning of a new daily sometime in the 
summer of 1979. Hopefully, it \.Ilill fare better than previous competitors of 
the Pacific Daily News. 
Related to the political and economic pressures on journalists to join 
the establishment, there are also social pressures on Pacific Island journal-
ists, as described by Mr. Floyd Takeuchi, of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. The 
smallness of island societies tends to exacerbate this problem. 
All of the media panelists agreed that there is a need for more local and 
pan-Pacific news coverage, better communication lines among journalists, and 
an independent adversary press. 
Dr. Scott Allen and Dr. George Kent both spoke of the new ocean technology 
and how it is affecting international ocean policy. What they discussed is 
really the crux of the whole question that this conference is addressing: 
liThe Emerging Pacific Island States." 
While the inevitable course of decolonization finally began to unfold in 
the Pacific in the 1960s, the technology was being developed for the massive 
extracti on of fi sh and mi nera 1 resources from the sea and its floor. Concur-
rently, there was the growing awareness of the shrinking and possible deple-
tion of the earth1s natural resources. The Pacific Ocean, covering one-third 
of the earth1s surface, may be the last terrestrial frontier. 
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As long as the islands remained well-behaved colonies, there was no 
cause for concern. But, as new sovereign states, they must be reckoned with 
in the international political arena. Although the islands are small, there 
are many of them. All together, with their 200-mile exclusive economic zones, 
they have the entire Pacific Ocean well covered. 
Who will have access to the emerging Pacific Island states and their 
waters is a matter of major concern. 
Pacific Islands Studies Program 
Miscellaneous Work Paper Series 
Since 1973 the Pacific Islands Studies Program has engaged in duplicating 
inexpensively various work papers whose contents appear to justify a wider 
dissemination than that of classroom contact or intra-University circulation. 
Most of these works consist of student papers submitted in academic courses, 
and which to some limited extent represent a contribution to existing know-
ledge of the Pacific Islands. Several works have centered on the preparation 
of bibliographies; heretofore not published but judged to be of important 
value to students and scholars engaged in Pacific Islands Studies. 
The title, author and date of each publication in the series is listed 
below. A publication may be presently out-of-print; however, in the event 
there are sufficient requests, the PISP may consider a reprint. It should 
be noted that copies have and/or are made available only to institutions and 
scholars interested and engaged in Pacific Islands Studies. 
Carl J. Daeufer, Pacific Islands Studies 
*** *** *** 
1973:1 Considerations on the Rights of Spain Over the Caroline Islands 
Translation and Introduction by Patricia Bieber 
1974:1 Bibliography of Hawaiian Language Materials at the University of 
Hawa ii, r~anoa Campus - Compil ed by Nancy Jane Morri s, Verna H. F. 
Young, Kehau Kahapea, Velda Yamanaka 
1974:2 Chapters on Hawaii and the Marianas in V.M. Golovnin's Voyage 
Around the World - Translated by Ella Wiswell 
1974:3 Pacific-related .A.udiovisual ~1aterials for Secondary Schools 
Phyllis Turnbull 
1974:4 Pacific Islands Workshop for College Librarians in Hawaii, 
April 8-9, 1974 
1974:5 Russian Writings on the South Pacific (A preliminary edition) 
Patricia Polansky 
1974:6 Pacific Islands Workshop for Secondary School Librarians and 
Social Studies Teachers in Hawaii, June 13-14, 1974 
1975:1 The Bougainville Taro Blight - Jerry C. Packard 
1975:2 Bibliographies of the Kermadec Islands, Niue, Swains Island and 
the Tokelau Islands - William G. Coppell 
1976:1 Micronesian and Polynesian Voyaging - Three Readings 
Lesley Bruce, Patricia Schattenburg, Patricia Price Beggerly 
1977:1 A World Catalogue of Theses and Dissertations Concerning the 
Education of the Peoples of the Pacific Islands (Including the 
New Zealand Maori) - William G. Coppell 
1977:2 The Samoan Archives. An annotated list of the archival material of 
the various governments of Western Samoa from the middle of the 
Nineteenth Century to the first quarter of the Twentieth Century 
Ashby J. Fristoe 
1978:1 The Use of Nearshore Marine Life as a Food Resource by American 
Samoans - Harry Burnette Hill 
1978:2 A History and Some Traditions of Pingelap, An Atoll in the Eastern 
Caroline" Islands - Jane Newcomb Hurd 
1978:3 Captain Cook and the Pacific Islands. The Proceedings of the Third 
Annual Pacific Islands Studies Conference, March 31 and April 1, 1978 
1979:1 A Status Study of Commercial Cinema in the Pacific Islands - Floyd K. 
Takeuchi 
1979:2 The Emerging Pacific Island States. The Proceedings of the Fourth 
Annual Pacific ISlands Studies Conference, April 6-7, 1979 
1979:3 Urbanization in the Pacific: A Tentative Survey - Donald R. Shuster 
